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The discovery of causal relations seems a central activity of the high- level sciences, 
including the special sciences and certain branches of macrophysics. Those same 
sciences are less successful in formulating exceptionless laws. if causation must be 
underwritten by exceptionless laws, we are faced with a puzzle. Attempts have been 
made to dissolve this puzzle by showing that non- exceptionless generalizations 
can underwrite causal relations. The trouble is that many of these attempts fail to 
distinguish between two importantly different types of exception of which high- 
level scientific generalizations admit. roughly speaking, one is where the values of 
high- level variables not represented in the generalization are abnormal: call these 
‘background factor’ (bf) exceptions. For example, the ideal Gas Law (iGL) may be sig-
nificantly violated by a gas if a strong electric current is passed through it. Another 
is where the high- level states that are represented by variables in the generalization 
are realized in certain abnormal ways: call these ‘mr exceptions’ (exceptions having 
to do with the multiple realizability of high- level states). For example, the pressure 
of a gas may not be proportional to its temperature and volume in the way that the 
iGL describes if the initial macrostate of the gas is realized in a certain unusual mi-
crophysical way. While existing attempts to show that non- exceptionless generaliza-
tions can underwrite causal relations tend to work well where the generalization ad-
mits only of bf exceptions, they work less well when the generalizations in question 
admit— as most high- level scientific generalizations do— of mr exceptions. i argue 
that the best prospect for resolving the apparent problem posed by mr exceptions is 
to regard the generalizations which admit of them as approximations to probabilistic 
generalizations which don’t, and which are themselves able to support relations of 
probabilistic causation.
1. Introduction
The ‘high- level’ sciences are sciences other than fundamental physics. These in-
clude certain macro- physical sciences, such as thermodynamics, and also special 
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sciences, such as biology, chemistry, ecology, and economics. The search for and 
discovery of causes seems a central activity of these high- level sciences.1 For 
example, we are told in school physics lessons that decreasing the volume of a 
container of gas will increase its pressure (if temperature and gas amount are 
held constant). Meanwhile ecologists tell us that a reduction in the size of a pop-
ulation may cause an increase in its growth rate, cellular biologists tell us that 
gene mutations can cause cancer, and economists tell us that the Fed’s lowering 
of interest rates may cause a rise in inflation.
davidson (1970) famously thought that causal relations must be underwrit-
ten by exceptionless laws. if he were right, we would have a puzzle on our hands 
since the generalizations formulated by practitioners of the high- level sciences 
are typically non- exceptionless. Yet philosophers including LePore and Loewer 
(1987), Fodor (1989), and Hitchcock and Woodward (2003a; 2003b) have argued 
that— by the lights of the most popular contemporary theories of causation— 
non- exceptionless generalizations can underwrite causation.
in this paper, i will distinguish two types of exception of which high- level 
generalizations typically admit. roughly speaking, one is where the values of 
high- level variables not represented in the generalization in question are abnor-
mal or changeable: call these ‘background factor’ (bf) exceptions. For example, the 
ideal Gas Law (iGL) may be significantly violated by a gas if a strong electric 
current is passed through it. Another type of exception is where the high- level 
states that are represented by variables in the generalization are realized in certain 
abnormal ways. These are exceptions that arise due to the multiple realizability of 
high- level states: call them ‘mr exceptions’. For example, the pressure of a gas 
may not be proportional to its temperature and volume in the way described by 
the iGL if the initial macrostate of the gas is realized in a certain unusual micro-
physical way.
i will argue that, while existing arguments succeed in showing that general-
izations that admit only of bf exceptions are able to underwrite causal relations, 
they do not show that generalizations that admit of mr exceptions are able to do 
so, and that mr exceptions pose a greater problem for the ability of generaliza-
tions to underwrite causal relations. This is important because most high- level 
generalizations employed by scientists admit of mr exceptions as well as bf ex-
ceptions.
The distinction between these two classes of exception is not new: similar 
distinctions have been made by Fodor (1991), Hoefer (2004), and Fenton- Glynn 
(2016). The distinction is also implicit in the earlier work of Fodor (1974; 1989) 
and Schiffer (1991) (cf. earman & roberts 1999). Hoefer reaches the view that the 
1. i won’t discuss whether fundamental physics seeks or discovers causes. For helpful discus-
sion see Price and Corry (2007) and Frisch (2014a).
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type of exception that i’m calling ‘mr exceptions’ is “either in tension with, or in 
outright conflict with” the existence of “genuine causation— causation of a robust 
metaphysical type, with some genuine modal component, and applicable at the 
level of ordinary events” (2004: 113). it is this tension that i will seek to dissolve 
at the end of this essay.
in what follows, i will explain the distinction and relation between ‘high- 
level’ sciences and fundamental physics more precisely (Section 2). i will then 
more precisely explicate the notion of a bf exception (Section 3) and explain 
why— despite prima facie appearances— bf exceptions don’t pose problems for a 
generalization’s ability to underwrite causal relations (Section 4). i will then ex-
plicate the notion of an mr exception (Section 5) and explain why such exceptions 
pose more of a problem (Section 6). Finally, i will propose and defend a solution 
to the problem posed by the fact that high- level generalizations typically admit 
of mr exceptions (Section 7 and Section 8). Specifically, i’ll argue that high- level 
generalizations that admit of mr exceptions (which is plausibly all, or almost 
all, of them) are approximations to probabilistic high- level generalizations that 
don’t, and which are able to sustain relations of (probabilistic) high- level causa-
tion. Along the way (Section 7) i will respond to objections due to Hoefer (2004) 
to the sort of solution that i pursue.
2. High- Level Sciences
As i indicated above, the ‘high- level’ sciences include certain macrophysical 
sciences— such as thermodynamics— as well as ‘special’ sciences— such as biol-
ogy. These sciences are aptly described as ‘high- level’ because the states they 
concern are multiply realizable by the states of concern to microphysics.2 Take two 
sets of possible states of a system: P and Q. States in Q are multiply realizable 
by states in P iff
(MR)  For each state q ∈ Q there is some P’ ⊆ P such that, (i) necessarily, 
for each state pi ∈ P’, any system that is in state pi is in state q; (ii) 
2. i prefer to talk about ‘states’ rather than ‘properties’ because scientific generalizations gen-
erally concern the possible states of types of system (see Friend 2016), such as ecosystems, free 
market economies, and thermodynamically isolated systems. (i won’t attempt to give a metaphys-
ics of systemhood— for helpful remarks, see Schurz 2001: 479— but will confine myself to giving 
examples of paradigm cases.) i take a state of a system just to be a complex of properties that it 
instantiates and/or a complex of properties instantiated by its parts. in what follows, i’ll follow 
standard practice in taking the state of a system to be representable by a vector of variables. The 
value of a variable may represent whether or not the system, or one of its parts, possesses a certain 
property (such as viscosity), or what determinate of a determinable property (such as tempera-
ture) it possesses.
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necessarily, any system that is in state q is in some state pi ∈ P’; 
and (iii) there is a pair of states pi, pj ∈ P’ such that, possibly, some 
system is in state pi but not in state pj and, possibly, some system is 
in state pj but not in state pi.3
The notion that the possible microphysical states of a system multiply realize 
other of its states is drawn upon by List and Pivato (2015), who give what is per-
haps the most rigorous explication to date of the notion that different sciences 
are concerned with different ‘levels’ of reality.
A system (which may be the universe as a whole, or some subsystem of it, 
such as a gas in a container) has a microphysical state space, which List and 
Pivato (2015: 121) denote S. in classical physics,4 the microphysical state space is 
a phase space of 6N dimensions, with three spatial and three momentum dimen-
sions for each of the N particles that compose the system. A point in this space 
corresponds to a microstate of the system, that is, a precise position and momen-
tum for each of the particles it comprises.
List and Pivato (2015: 121) take a microphysical history of a system to be rep-
resentable by a function h(⋅) from times into S, with h(t) being the microstate of 
the system at time t. On List and Pivato’s account, then, a system’s micro- history 
is a path through its phase space S. in their formalism, Ω is that subset of all 
(logically) possible micro- histories that are nomologically possible (specifically, 
possible according to the fundamental dynamical laws). For any micro- history 
h(⋅) and time t, they take ht(⋅) to denote the restriction of h(⋅) to all times up to 
t— what List and Pivato (2015: 121) call a ‘truncated history’ of the system. A con-
tinuation of ht(⋅) is a micro- history h′(⋅) such that ht′(⋅) ≡ ht(⋅). The laws governing 
a system’s path through S are deterministic iff for every truncation of a history 
in Ω, there is only one continuation of that history in Ω. For our purposes, it will 
also be useful to define the notion of a future- truncation ht+(⋅) of h(⋅), which de-
notes the restriction of h(⋅) to all times after t.
3. This definition implies that the states in Q supervene upon those in P. i think this is ap-
propriate, since it doesn’t seem that a state could properly count as a realizer of some other state 
unless the former state necessitated the latter. i suppose that a functionalist might object, claiming 
that a state can properly be said to realize another, even though the instantiation of the former 
necessitates the instantiation of the latter only when the former stands in the right causal/nomological 
relations to other low- level states. in response, we could simply tweak our definition of multiple real-
izability to allow realizers that necessitate their realizees only given the external relations that they 
stand in. nothing in what follows turns on these subtleties.
4. in what follows, i will, for the most part, assume that microphysics is classical and deter-
ministic. This is merely for simplicity, and because nothing of substance in what follows turns on 
this assumption. Things could readily be re- cast to accommodate the assumption that microphys-
ics is quantum mechanical and probabilistic. For a start, this would involve replacing the assump-
tion that a system’s basic state space is a phase space with the assumption that it is a space of all 
possible quantum states of the system.
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List and Pivato (2015: 131– 132) take a higher- level state to correspond to an 
equivalence class of microphysical states, comprising all the possible realizations 
of that high- level state by microphysical states of the system. They call a parti-
tion of S into a set of equivalence classes a coarse graining of S and denote this 
new coarse- grained state space 𝕊, with each element 𝕤∈𝕊 representing a higher- 
level state of the system. The elements of 𝕊 are thus multiply realizable by the 
elements of S. A history through 𝕊, denoted 𝕙(⋅), is a function from times into 
𝕊, with 𝕙(t) being the state in 𝕊 that the system occupies at t (List & Pivato 2015: 
132). Moreover 𝕙t(⋅) can be used to denote the restriction of 𝕙(⋅) to times up to t: 
that is, 𝕙t(⋅) is a ‘truncated history’ through 𝕊. A continuation of 𝕙t(⋅) is a history 
𝕙′(⋅) such that 𝕙′t(⋅)≡𝕙t(⋅). We can also define the notion of a future- truncation 
𝕙t+(⋅) of 𝕙(⋅), which denotes the restriction of 𝕙(⋅) to all times after t.
The special sciences, as well as certain branches of macrophysics, such as 
thermodynamics, are concerned with such coarse- grained states of systems (i 
take this to be why they are correctly characterizable as ‘high- level’). But not 
every coarse- grained state space, 𝕊, is likely to be the concern of some or other 
actual high- level science.5 Some may be too coarse to be of interest (e.g., if 𝕊 con-
tains only one element— the state the system occupies iff some necessary truth 
holds); some may be too fine- grained to be of interest (e.g., if 𝕊 is only a slight 
coarse- graining of S, then the relative ease of formulating and using generaliza-
tions in terms of the states represented by 𝕊 may not outweigh the loss of ac-
curacy relative to working with the states represented by S); some may just be 
coarse- grained in the wrong ways (e.g., if 𝕊 contains elements like 𝕤grue, which 
the system occupies iff either it is in thermodynamic equilibrium or it has a sub-
region which has temperature 300°K). The coarse- grained states of systems that 
special scientists actually concern themselves with are those which have been 
found to be tractable and fruitful to work with for creatures with our epistemic 
and technological capacities and perhaps with our predilection for certain clas-
sificatory schemes rather than others.
One nice feature of the picture presented by List and Pivato (2015: 150 Foot-
note) is that it doesn’t imply that the relation ‘is higher level than’ generates a 
total order. it may be that, for two different coarse- grainings of S, 𝕊1 and 𝕊2, it 
is true neither that 𝕊1 is higher- level than 𝕊2, nor that 𝕊2 is higher- level than 𝕊1, 
nor even that 𝕊1 and 𝕊2 are equally high- level. One way this could be the case 
is if there is at least one element 𝕤1∈𝕊1 that corresponds to an equivalence class 
of elements of 𝕊2 and there is at least one element 𝕤2∈𝕊2 that corresponds to an 
equivalence class of elements of 𝕊1. Another way is if there are elements of 𝕊1 
and 𝕊2 that ‘cross- cut’ each other (as the states of being positively charged and 
5. Cohen and Callender (2009: 22– 24) make an analogous point, but express it in terms of 
languages/classificatory schemes rather than coarse- grainings per se.
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negatively charged cross- cut the gruesome states of being pegatively charged 
and nositively charged6), so that it’s true of neither 𝕊1 nor 𝕊2 that all of its ele-
ments correspond to equivalence classes of elements of the other (nor are their 
elements identical).
instead, the relation ‘is higher- level than’, as List and Pivato explicate it, 
merely generates a partial order. This seems to be precisely as it should be if 
the relation is one in which the various sciences are supposed to stand to one 
another. For example, the question of whether the ecological state of an ecosys-
tem is a higher- , lower- , or same- level state as its thermodynamic state seems 
unanswerable (cf. Kim 2002). List and Pivato’s account provides a satisfying ex-
planation of why: it is not the case that thermodynamic states are identical to 
ecological states, nor is it the case the set of thermodynamic states corresponds 
to a set of equivalence classes of ecological states nor vice versa: one can almost 
certainly hold the ecological state of an ecosystem fixed while slightly varying its 
thermodynamic state (e.g., by slightly warming or cooling part of the ecosystem 
for a brief time), and one can almost certainly hold the thermodynamic state of 
an ecosystem fixed while slightly varying its ecological state (replace some fe-
males of a certain population with some males). Thus, List and Pivato’s account 
overcomes some key difficulties with more traditional explications of the ‘levels’ 
of reality such as that given by Oppenheim and Putnam (1958)— which appear 
to suggest that these ‘levels’ constitute a total order.
This explication of the notion of a ‘level’ will be useful in what follows, par-
ticularly when we come to focus on mr exceptions in Section 5 and Section 6. 
But to begin with, we will turn our attention to what i’m calling bf exceptions, 
which will be seen to pose less of a problem for high- level causation. it will be 
instructive to consider why generalizations that admit only of bf exceptions can 
nevertheless support causal relations as this will allow us to see why those same 
reasons don’t also apply to generalizations that admit of mr exceptions.
6. Something is nositively (pegatively) charged if it is negatively (positively) charged and its 
charge is first measured by a human prior to the year 2020 or otherwise if it is positively (negative-
ly) charged. Suppose that a system comprises n particles, including both positively and negatively 
charged particles, with some but not all of each type first measured for charge prior to 2020. Then 
consider two sets 𝕊1 and 𝕊2 of states, with 𝕊1 containing all and only states corresponding to de-
scriptions of the form ‘comprises l positively charged particles and m negatively charged particles’ 
(for all pairs of non- negative integers, l and m such that l + m = n), and 𝕊2 containing all and only 
states corresponding to descriptions of the form ‘comprises l nositively charged particles and m 
pegatively charged particles’ (for all pairs of non- negative integers, l and m such that l + m = n). The 
elements of 𝕊1 and 𝕊2 then cross- classify in the sense that the elements of neither corresponds to 
equivalence classes of elements of the other.
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3. ‘Background Factor’ (BF) Exceptions
it is a common observation that the generalizations formulated in the high- level 
sciences typically admit of exceptions. A standard term for a generalization that 
admits of exceptions but that is at least a prima facie candidate for playing at 
least some aspects of the law role tolerably well is ceteris paribus (cp) law. On the 
whole, i shall avoid speaking of such generalizations as ‘laws’, but shall just 
speak of them as (scientific) ‘generalizations’ in order to avoid pre- judging the 
question of precisely how well these generalizations play the law role (and, in 
particular, whether they are capable of underwriting causal relations). i will also 
tend to avoid speaking of such generalizations as ‘ceteris paribus’ generalizations, 
for i think use of that terminology can obscure the different types of exception of 
which high- level scientific generalizations admit.7
One category of exception of which high- level generalizations typically ad-
mit arises when certain high- level variables not represented in the generaliza-
tion take values that interfere with the holding of the generalization. These are 
what i’m calling background factor (or bf) exceptions. (As will be seen in Section 5, 
high- level generalizations also typically admit of exceptions that arise when cer-
tain background micro- variables take unusual values.) in fact, there are at least 
two cases to distinguish, corresponding at least roughly to Schurz’s (2002) dis-
tinction between comparative ceteris paribus laws and exclusive ceteris paribus laws, 
or what he later (Schurz 2014) calls ‘literal’ ceteris paribus laws and ceteris rectis 
laws.8 A comparative (or ‘literal’) ceteris paribus (cp) law is one that holds only 
when the values of certain background variables remain constant (Schurz 2002: 
351– 352; 2014: 1802– 1803). Boyle’s Law is an example, holding as it does only 
when temperature is constant. By contrast, an exclusive cp law (or a ceteris rectis 
law) is one that holds only when certain background factors are absent or, more 
precisely, when the values of certain background variables lie outside a certain range 
(Schurz 2002: 352– 353, 353– 354; 2014: 1803).9 We will see that Boyle’s law is plau-
7. indeed, although the primary distinction i will draw is between bf exceptions and mr ex-
ceptions, i will also note two other types of exception below (and comment on their implications 
for a generalization’s ability to underwrite causal relations): exceptions that some generalizations 
admit of when variables represented in the generalization take values outside a certain range (cf. 
Hitchcock & Woodward 2003a; 2003b); and ‘exceptions’ that arise because the generalization only 
properly applies to ideal systems (as the ideal Gas Law does) to which real world systems at best 
approximate.
8. Schurz (2002; 2014) is one of a number of philosophers who thus is careful not to run to-
gether the various types of exception of which high- level scientific generalizations admit.
9. in fact, Schurz’s (2014: 1808) formal explication of ceteris rectis laws makes it clear that 
he wishes his notion of them to cover both cases where the generalization only holds for a certain 
range of values of background variables not represented in the generalization (2014: 1802– 1803) 
and cases where the generalization only holds for a certain range of values of variables that are 
represented in the generalization (2014: 1804) and cases where the generalization holds only for 
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sibly also an example of what Schurz calls an exclusive cp law (the two categories 
are therefore not mutually exclusive— see Schurz 2002: 353; 2014: 1803– 1804; re-
utlinger, Schurz, & Hüttemann 2017: Section 3.1), since it may be violated (for 
example) in the presence of a strong electric field.
Boyle’s law, a simple example drawn from thermodynamics, states that the 
pressure and volume of an ideal gas are inversely related:
(Boyle’s Law)  PV = k
Here P represents pressure, V volume, and k is a constant.
Of course it is well known that so stated, Boyle’s Law admits of exceptions: 
specifically it does not hold if temperature and/or the amount of gas is varied. it 
thus counts as an example of what Schurz calls a comparative cp law.10 Of course 
it turns out to be possible to take explicit account of temperature and the amount 
of substance of the gas, and this is something that is done in the ideal Gas Law 
(iGL):
(iGL) PV = nRT
As before, P is pressure and V is volume, but here T is the absolute temperature 
of the gas, n the amount of substance of the gas (in moles), and R is the ideal gas 
constant. The iGL is thus a generalization of Boyle’s Law that explicitly models 
the temperature and the amount of gas. Correspondingly, the constant R, unlike 
the constant k, does not vary from system to system (the value of k in Boyle’s 
Law depends upon the amount of substance and temperature of the gas). The 
iGL thus covers cases that constituted exceptions to Boyle’s Law, namely, cases 
where temperature or the amount of the gas are not constant.
it is worth noting that both Boyle’s Law and the iGL properly apply only to 
ideal gases: that is gases comprising point particles that interact with container 
walls only via perfectly elastic collisions. Actual gases are not ideal, but many— 
certain ranges of both sorts of variable. it is exceptions that arise due to variables not represented 
in the generalization not taking the ‘right’ values or— corresponding to comparative/literal cp 
clauses— not remaining constant that i’m calling bf exceptions. As i explain in Footnote 30 below, 
Hitchcock and Woodward (2003a; 2003b) show that a generalization’s admitting of exceptions 
when the values of variables that are represented in it take values outside a certain range does not 
per se prevent it from underwriting causal relations.
10. earman and roberts (1999: 461– 462) claim that Boyle’s Law is not a cp generalization. 
However, aside from their general skepticism about cp generalizations, their specific argument 
for this claim merely shows that the fact that it concerns ideal gases does not ipso facto make it a cp 
generalization. (i shall have more to say about its appeal to ideal gases in the main text below.) Yet, 
as indicated in the main text, there are independent (and compelling) reasons for taking Boyle’s 
Law to be a cp generalization (or at least— what is more important for our purposes— to admit of 
bf exceptions).
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especially lighter ones— approximate the behavior of ideal gases, especially at 
high temperatures and low pressures. Thus, the iGL can be used to make ap-
proximately correct predictions about them (cf. roberts 2014: 1782– 1783). More 
about how this relates to these generalizations’ ability to support causal relations 
will be said in Section 4.
Although iGL is immune to some classes of exception from which Boyle’s 
Law suffers, it will still break down given certain values of background macro- 
variables. For instance, if a gas is subjected to a strong electromagnetic field, a 
Townsend avalanche can result. This is a process whereby free electrons accel-
erated by the electric field collide with gas molecules, freeing further electrons 
in a cascade effect.11 The resulting gas ions are accelerated towards the cathode 
(while the electrons accelerate towards the anode). in such circumstances the 
iGL is liable no longer to yield particularly accurate predictions. in Schurz’s ter-
minology, the iGL (and, by extension, Boyle’s Law) is an exclusive cp law, holding 
as it does only when the electric current run through a gas is not too strong.12
While Townsend avalanches can be modeled by physicists, the models are 
complex and it’s not likely that in more mundane circumstances many would 
be tempted, rather than using the iGL, to appeal to some more complex model 
(i.e., generalization or set of generalizations) that incorporates the influence of 
electromagnetic charge. Moreover, it’s plausible that any such more complex 
model would itself be subject to provisos— of the exclusive cp and/or the compara-
tive cp sort— either because there are further background factors besides electro-
magnetic charge that can interfere with the usual relation between gas pressure, 
volume, amount, and temperature, or because the influence of electromagnetic 
charge on gas behavior may itself admit of interference by background factors.
it’s interesting to think about the relationship between Boyle’s Law and the 
iGL in terms of List and Pivato’s model. A gas in a container can be represented 
by a two- dimensional state space, with one dimension corresponding to the vari-
able V and the other dimension corresponding to the variable P. Only certain 
temporal paths (histories) through that two- dimensional state space are compat-
ible with Boyle’s Law together with the value of k for the gas in question.
The trouble is that what’s compatible with Boyle’s Law isn’t what’s genu-
inely nomologically possible. As we’ve seen, exceptions to Boyle’s Law may 
arise if the temperature or amount of gas is varied. This means that the gas may 
11. in giving this example, we are relaxing slightly our usual assumption that the microphys-
ics of the system is classical.
12. Alternatively, one might say that the post- ionization gas is no longer approximately ideal, 
so we might think of this as a case that is simply outside the scope of application of the iGL. 
Whether we take the behavior of the gas in the presence of a strong electric current to constitute an 
exception to the iGL or whether we take it to lie outside of its scope, such behavior shall be seen 
in Section 4 to pose a prima facie challenge to the iGL’s ability to underwrite relations of high- level 
causation.
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take paths through this two- dimensional state space that are incompatible with 
Boyle’s Law.
The iGL, by contrast, lends itself to a representation of the gas by a four- 
dimensional state space, with dimensions corresponding, not only to pressure 
P and volume V, but also to temperature T and the quantity of gas n. The iGL 
implies constraints on the temporal paths the gas system may take through this 
four- dimensional state space. it also implies constraints on the temporal paths 
the gas may take through the original two- dimensional state space, though it has 
a more liberal (and accurate) view of what these nomologically possible paths 
are than does Boyle’s Law because it allows that if temperature and gas quantity 
vary (corresponding to changes in the constant k in Boyle’s Law), the inverse 
proportionality between pressure and volume described by Boyle’s Law need 
not hold.
To the extent that the iGL itself admits of bf exceptions, that’s because further 
variables not represented in the law— such as electric current— may have a bear-
ing on the relationship between temperature, pressure, volume, and gas quan-
tity that the generalization describes. To explicitly incorporate these variables 
into our model would effectively be to represent the gas system in terms of an 
even higher dimensional state space. Whether we can expect ever to arrive at a 
model that does not admit of bf exceptions by incorporating enough variables is 
a question that we’ll return to below.
As a further illustration of a high- level scientific generalization that admits of 
bf exceptions (this time one drawn from a special science rather than macrophys-
ics), consider the Logistic equation (Le) from population ecology:13
(Le) 1 1
1
1
c
dn nr n
dt K
 −
=  
 
Here n1 is the population size, t is time (so 1dndt is the population growth rate), K 
is the carrying capacity (the maximum sustainable population size given the state 
of the environment), and rc is the population’s ‘intrinsic per capita growth rate’ 
(the rate at which it would grow in the absence of competition for resources). Le 
implies that when the number n1 of members of a species in a particular habitat 
is small relative to the carrying capacity— so that there is little intra- population 
competition for resources— the actual population growth rate 1dndt  is close to the 
intrinsic per capita growth rate rc multiplied by the number n1 of individuals in 
the population. But, as the population grows, the actual per capita growth rate 
declines linearly— due to increasing competition. This decline continues until 
the carrying capacity K is reached, at which point population growth is 0.
While no single equation for population growth models all populations at all 
13. This is discussed as an example of a cp generalization in Fenton- Glynn (2016).
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times well, there are some populations that the Le does model well (see Tsou-
laris & Wallace 2002). nevertheless, even for such populations, the Le holds only 
given that certain background factors are absent (or constant): it will not hold 
in the event of the population being subject to a cull, or if a natural disaster de-
stroys a large part of the population, or if a predatory species suddenly enters 
the habitat, and so on.
Of course one might devise a more complex growth model that includes 
variables representing some of the factors relevant to population growth that 
aren’t modeled by the Le. For instance, Weiss (2009) describes a logistic growth 
model that incorporates predator- prey dynamics (call it WLM for ‘Weiss’s Lo-
gistic Model’). The model comprises the following two differential equations:
(WLM) 1 11 1 2
1
c
dn nr n an n
dt K
 −
= − 
 
Here n1 is the size of the prey population, n2 is the size of the predator popula-
tion, rc is the intrinsic per capita growth rate of the prey population (the per 
capita growth rate that it would have in the absence of intra- species competition 
for resources and predation), K is (as before) the carrying capacity, γ is the preda-
tor death rate, α is the capture efficiency— a measure of the effect of a predator 
on the per capita growth rate of the prey population— and β is the product of the 
capture efficiency and the biomass conversion efficiency— a measure of the abil-
ity of predators to convert prey into per capita growth. The model reduces to the 
logistic model where n2 = 0, and thus has that model as a special case.
in terms of List and Pivato’s representation, we can think of Le as model-
ling the evolution of a relatively simple system— a single population— through 
a state space of relatively few dimensions: one- dimensional if we think of n1 as 
the only true variable in Le (note that an additional dimension isn’t required to 
represent the actual growth rate, since this is represented by the function from 
times to points in this state space— the history of the system at the level of this 
state space); three- dimensional if we wish to represent the nomological possibility 
of changes in K and rc. Only certain temporal paths, or histories, through this 
state space are compatible with Le (given the values of K and rc). However, the 
histories, or temporal paths, through this state space that are possible by the 
lights of Le are only a subset of the true nomologically possible histories. That’s 
because Le ignores factors independent of n1, K, and rc that affect the population 
growth rate. This may be quite appropriate where there is no such influence, or 
where it is negligible. However, sometimes such influences do prevent approxi-
mate logistic growth.
2
2 1 2
dn n n n
dt
γ β= − +
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in cases where (for example) the influence of a predator population is sig-
nificant, WLM may yield more accurate predictions. WLM treats the system— or 
in fact a more complex system, including the predator population— as repre-
sentable by means of a state space with at least one additional dimension, cor-
responding to n2 (more if we’re prepared to think of α, β, and γ as implicitly 
variable). WLM also implies constraints on the evolution of the prey population 
through the lower- dimensional state space that lacks a dimension correspond-
ing to the size of the predator population. However, the constraints are weaker 
(and more accurately reflect the possibilities) than those implied by Le because 
it allows that large predator numbers may lead to growth behavior for the prey 
population that deviates significantly from that predicted by Le.
WLM itself admits of bf exceptions. Any number of factors not represented in 
WLM— disease, war, natural disaster, continual culling, contraceptive injections, 
and so on— could all prevent a population growing in the manner predicted by 
WLM. indeed, given the extremely large number of factors that can impact pop-
ulation growth, it seems that even the most sophisticated and complex popula-
tion growth models that ecologists are likely to be able to devise will continue to 
admit of bf exceptions.
in general scientists rarely, if ever, formulate high- level generalizations that 
are entirely immune to bf exceptions. For one thing, attempting to do so would 
yield generalizations so complex as to be intractable. indeed, the influence of some 
background factors may be so complex and/or unpredictable that scientists don’t 
know, and perhaps are unlikely ever to know, how to take them into account in 
their models. Moreover, it is plausible that scientists typically do not even know, 
or can’t even list, all of the relevant factors and that they certainly couldn’t be listed 
without going outside of the usual subject matter of the discipline in question (see 
Lange 2002: 416– 418; cf. davidson 1970: 94, 99; 1974: 43; Fodor 1989: 69 Footnote; 
Schiffer 1991: 3– 4; earman & roberts 1999: 447 Footnote, 462– 463; Hüttemann & 
reutlinger 2013: 183, 189– 190; reutlinger 2014: 1761, 1765– 1766). in some cases, 
the possible interfering factors may be indefinite or even infinite (cf. Pietroski & 
rey 1995: 101– 102; earman & roberts 1999: 439, 441; Schurz 2001: 477; Lange 2002: 
410– 411; Hüttemann & reutlinger 2013: 183; reutlinger 2014: 1761).
4. BF Exceptions and Causation
The lack of exceptionless laws in the high- level sciences might seem to pose a 
problem for accommodating high- level causation because laws that admit of 
exceptions might be thought unable to underwrite the relations of nomic suf-
ficiency and counterfactual dependence appealed to by some of the leading con-
temporary accounts of causation.
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On the face of it, it seems plausible that decreasing the volume of the con-
tainer in which a gas is contained can cause the gas pressure to increase. And, 
indeed, Boyle’s Law implies that a decrease in the volume will be associated 
with an increase in pressure. Yet we know that the inverse relation between vol-
ume and pressure described by Boyle’s Law admits of bf exceptions. if the gas 
is cooled sufficiently as the volume of the container is decreased, the pressure 
won’t increase. So a decrease in gas volume is not genuinely nomically sufficient 
for an increase in gas pressure. if a cause must be nomically sufficiency for its 
effect then, rather counterintuitively, it appears that the decrease in gas volume 
does not cause an increase in gas pressure even on an occasion where the tem-
perature of the gas is held constant and the gas pressure does increase.
A natural rejoinder is that a cause need not be nomically sufficient for its 
effect, but need only be a non- redundant element of a set of actually- obtaining 
conditions that is jointly sufficient for the effect (Mackie 1965; Wright 1985). 
Where the volume of a gas is decreased and its temperature is not simultane-
ously decreased (or at least is not decreased too much), the pressure of the gas 
increases, as is implied by the iGL. The decrease in volume alone is not nomical-
ly sufficient for the increase in pressure. However, it is a non- redundant element 
of a set of conditions— including the decrease in volume and the non- decrease 
(by too much) of the temperature— that is sufficient for the increase in pressure. 
Sophisticated (and superior) regularity accounts of causation therefore classify 
it as a cause.
Yet, as we have already noted, even the regularity described by the iGL ad-
mits of bf exceptions. Volume decrease even together with temperature non- 
decrease (by too much) may not be nomically sufficient for pressure increase. 
We might set up a fancy piece of apparatus with a cathode placed in the center 
of the gas and an anode placed around the container wall. inducing a strong 
enough electric field through the gas would— even while the volume of the con-
tainer were decreased and the gas temperature were not decreased— result a 
Townsend Avalanche with the gas ions accelerating toward the cathode, reduc-
ing the pressure on the container walls.
Still, one might think, we can just add the fact that— on the occasion in 
question— no fancy piece of apparatus like that described in the previous para-
graph was present (or, more generally, that no strong electric current was passed 
through the gas) to the fact that the volume decreased and the temperature didn’t 
decrease (by too much) to arrive at a set of conditions that is jointly sufficient and 
individually non- redundant for the increase in pressure.
Yet probably there are still further factors that might prevent volume de-
crease, together with temperature non- decrease and an absence of a strong elec-
tric current, being associated with pressure increase. So the question becomes, 
can we (or could we at least in principle) keep adding the absence of such inter-
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fering background factors to our set of conditions in order to ultimately arrive at 
one that contains conditions that are genuinely jointly sufficient and individual-
ly non- redundant for the effect in question? This is a question that we will return 
to shortly, after considering our other case study: population ecology.
in population ecology, a reduction in the size of a population (perhaps by 
means of a cull) might be thought to cause an increase in its growth rate (due to a 
reduction in intra- species competition for resources). Such an association between 
population size and growth rate is described by the Le. Yet the Le admits of bf 
exceptions, meaning that a reduction in population size isn’t genuinely sufficient 
for an increase in growth rate. For instance, if a large number of predators were 
introduced into the habitat of the population at the same time as the population 
size was reduced, then an increase in the population growth rate may not follow.
As with the previous example, the obvious response is to observe that so-
phisticated regularity theories do not require that a cause be nomically sufficient 
for its effect, but only a non- redundant element of a set of conditions present 
on the occasion in question which were jointly sufficient for the effect. Thus, 
if the size of a population is reduced and there is not an increase in a predator 
population (or at least not too much of an increase), the population growth rate 
increases, as implied by WLM. The reduction in the size of the population is 
thus a non- redundant element of a set of conditions (including the reduction in 
the size of the population and the non- increase, or non- increase- by- too- much, 
of any predator population) present on the occasion in question that is sufficient 
for an increase in the population growth rate. Sophisticated regularity theories 
therefore count it as a cause.
The trouble is, once again, that we in fact know that WLM itself admits of 
bf exceptions, so that population decrease even together with a non- increase in 
the size of any predator population is not nomically sufficient for an increase in 
population growth. indeed the background factors potentially relevant to popu-
lation growth might be so numerous that it will be practically— and maybe even 
in principle— impossible to formulate a generalization concerning population 
growth that doesn’t admit of bf exceptions and thus captures a set of conditions 
that is jointly sufficient (and individually necessary) for an increase in popula-
tion growth rate.
in spite of this, it seems that there may well be relations of nomic sufficiency 
that obtain between high- level states of affairs, even if scientists are unable in 
practice (or perhaps even in principle— for instance, if potentially interfering 
background factors are infinite in number) to formulate high- level generaliza-
tions that do not admit of bf exceptions. Providing these interfering factors are in 
fact absent, even infinitely many of them,14 then the result is that there exists a 
14. There is no reason to think an infinite condition cannot be satisfied. Suppose that space- 
time is dense (in the sense that, for any two space- time points, there’s a space- time point between 
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(possibly infinite) set of conditions which are jointly sufficient and individually 
necessary for the effect in question.
Fodor (1989) makes an analogous point in response to davidson’s (1970) 
worry that a lack of exceptionless psychophysical or psychological generaliza-
tions implies a prima facie difficulty for accommodating mental causation. Al-
though, in the following passage, Fodor makes the point with reference to a 
mental predicate M and a behavioral predicate B he takes analogous points to 
apply to the non- psychological special sciences:
The first – and crucial – step in getting what a robust construal of the 
causal responsibility of the mental requires is to square the idea that Ms 
are nomologically sufficient for Bs with the fact that psychological laws 
are hedged. How can you have it both that special laws only necessitate 
their consequents ceteris paribus and that we must get Bs whenever we 
get Ms. Answer: you can’t. But what you can have is just as good: viz., 
that if it’s a law that M → B ceteris paribus, then it follows that you get 
Bs whenever you get Ms and the ceteris paribus conditions are satisfied. 
(Fodor 1989: 73)
Fodor’s point is that, while the fact that all Ms are Bs only cp means that some-
thing’s being M is not nomically sufficient for its being B, when M is instantiated 
and the cp conditions are satisfied then we have a set of conditions, including M, 
that are jointly nomically sufficient for B.
We can apply the point to our running examples. even though the iGL ad-
mits of bf exceptions, a decrease in the volume of the gas may still be a non- 
redundant element of a set of conditions that jointly is nomologically sufficient 
for a rise in pressure. Some of these conditions— specifically, the failure of the 
temperature of the gas to be simultaneously lowered too much— are captured 
by variables that figure in the generalization itself. Some— such as the absence 
of some fancy apparatus involving a cathode placed in the middle of the gas— 
are not captured by variables that figure in the generalization, but at best can be 
thought of as covered by an implicit cp clause. Still if, on a particular occasion, 
the volume of a gas is decreased, the temperature of the gas isn’t decreased too 
them). Then consider some region R of space- time. And consider the claim that the world- line of 
the planet earth’s center of mass does not intersect R. This is equivalent to the infinite condition 
that the world- line of the earth’s center of mass does not intersect space- time point r ∈ R and that 
it does not intersect space- time point r′∈R and . . . . But even if space- time is dense clearly there 
can be a fact of the matter that earth’s center of mass doesn’t intersect R. So, in general, there’s no 
reason to think that infinite conditions can’t be satisfied. Lange (2002: esp. 407– 411) defends the 
view that there may be a fact of the matter about whether the cp clause associated with a high- level 
generalization is satisfied, even when we are unable to specify the associated conditions so as to 
render the law ‘fully explicit’. See also Fodor (1989: 74).
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much, there is no fancy apparatus involving a cathode placed in the middle of 
the gas, and so on (where the ‘and so on’ indicates that all those potentially in-
terfering background factors that we haven’t even considered are absent), then 
the decrease in volume is a non- redundant element of a set of actually obtaining 
conditions that is jointly sufficient for the rise in gas pressure (or at least for the 
degree of pressure rise— if, for example, temperature is increased simultaneous 
with the volume decrease). By the lights of sophisticated regularity theories of 
causation, the volume decrease will therefore count as a cause of the pressure 
increase.
Similarly, although WLM admits of bf exceptions, a reduction in population 
size may still be a non- redundant element of a set of conditions that jointly is 
nomically sufficient for an increase in population growth rate. Some of these 
conditions— for instance, the failure of the carrying capacity to simultaneously 
decline too much— are captured by variables that figure in the model. Others— 
such as the absence of a continual culling of members of the population— are 
not, but can be thought of as covered by an implicit cp clause. Still, if, on a par-
ticular occasion, the size of a population decreases, the carrying capacity doesn’t 
decrease too much, there is no continual culling, and so on, then the population 
decrease is a non- redundant element of a set of actually- obtaining conditions 
that is sufficient for the associated increase in population growth rate. Sophisti-
cated regularity theories of causation will therefore count the decrease in size of 
the population as a cause of the increase in the growth rate (or at least the degree 
of increase).
One might favor a counterfactual analysis of causation over a regularity the-
ory.15 And prima facie it might seem that generalizations that admit of bf excep-
tions are unable to support the counterfactual dependencies that, according to 
such analyses, underwrite causal relations. For instance, suppose that the vol-
ume of a gas is decreased and its pressure increases. Standard counterfactual 
theories of causation entail that this relation is causal if it’s true that, if the gas 
volume hadn’t decreased, the gas pressure wouldn’t have increased. Yet it might 
seem that this counterfactual is not true. After all, is it not the case that if the gas 
volume hadn’t decreased the gas pressure still might have increased— due to an 
increase in its temperature, or due to someone setting up a fancy anode/cathode 
apparatus?16
LePore and Loewer (1987: 640– 642)— drawing upon a point made by Lewis 
15. The classic statement of a counterfactual theory of causation is due to Lewis (1973b).
16. i take the might- counterfactual (φ ◊→ ψ) and the would- not counterfactual (φ □→ ~ψ) to 
be contraries: they can’t both be true together. This is weaker than the (also plausible) view (see 
Lewis 1973a) that the two counterfactuals are duals (i.e., that (φ ◊→ ψ) ↔ ~(φ □→ ~ψ)). The thesis 
that the two counterfactuals are at least contraries is defended (convincingly in my view) by Hájek 
(2017).
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(1973b: 563– 564)— have correctly pointed out that in fact high- level generaliza-
tions are able to support the sort of counterfactuals in terms of which causation is 
analyzed by counterfactual theories even if they admit of the sorts of bf exception 
that we have been discussing. Their point— which can be illustrated with respect 
to Boyle’s Law/the iGL— is that in many cases it will just be false that, if the gas 
volume hadn’t decreased there would or even might have been a rise in gas tem-
perature that would have meant that the gas pressure increased anyway. Like-
wise, in many cases it will just be false that, if the gas volume hadn’t decreased, 
there would or even might have been a bf exception to the iGL.
The point can be put in terms of Lewis’s (1973a; 1979) possible worlds se-
mantics for counterfactuals. Suppose that, on a certain occasion, the volume of 
a gas is decreased, the temperature and amount of the gas remains constant, the 
sorts of background factors (such as a strong electric current passed through the 
gas) that are apt to interfere with the association described by the iGL are absent, 
and the pressure of the gas rises. Then for it to be the case that, if the volume 
of the gas had not decreased, the temperature might have increased (or some 
interfering background factor might have been present), let alone that it would 
have increased (or that some interfering background factor would have been 
present), it would have to be the case that, among the closest possible worlds 
in which in which the gas pressure is not decreased, there are possible worlds 
in which the temperature of the gas increases (or some interfering background 
factor is present). But, on Lewis’s semantics, closeness is understood as similar-
ity, so the closest worlds to ours in which the volume of the gas is not decreased 
are the most similar such worlds. And since the temperature of the gas doesn’t 
increase in the actual world, and since interfering background factors are not 
present in the actual world, then unless the temperature’s non- increase or the 
non- interference of the background factors are themselves counterfactually de-
pendent upon the volume decrease (and there is no obvious reason to think that 
they typically are), this furnishes a strong presumption that the most similar 
worlds to ours in which the volume of the gas doesn’t decrease are also worlds 
in which the temperature of the gas doesn’t increase and interfering background 
factors are absent and in which the pressure of the gas therefore doesn’t increase. 
if that’s the case, then it’s true that, if the volume of the gas hadn’t decreased, 
then the pressure wouldn’t have increased and therefore that standard counter-
factual analyses of causation class the actual decrease in the volume of the gas as 
a cause of its increase in pressure.
Likewise, Le and WLM seem perfectly well able to support the sorts of coun-
terfactuals invoked by standard counterfactual theories of causation. Suppose 
that the size of a population is reduced (perhaps by a one- off cull) and suppose 
that there’s no simultaneous significant change in any predator population, in 
the carrying capacity or the intrinsic growth rate, or in the way in which the 
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predator and prey populations interact. Suppose, moreover, there’s no natural 
or human- caused disaster, no cull after the initial reduction in the population 
size, and so on. The population growth rate thus increases. Again, in most cir-
cumstances, it seems plausible that none of the most similar possible worlds to 
our own in which the population size isn’t reduced are worlds in which (unlike 
the actual world) there’s a simultaneous significant change in predator popula-
tion, in carrying capacity, in intrinsic growth rate or in predator/prey interac-
tion, etc. Hence it’s plausibly true that, if the size of the population hadn’t been 
decreased, the population growth rate would have been lower and therefore that 
standard counterfactual analyses of causation will class the actual decrease in 
population size as a cause of its increased growth rate.
Hitchcock and Woodward (2003a; 2003b) and Woodward (2003) also argue 
that non- exceptionless high- level generalizations are able to support the coun-
terfactuals relevant to causation. They develop the point in the context of the 
recent tradition of attempts to analyze causation using structural equations 
models (SeMs).17 Structural equations express functional dependencies between 
variables. The Le is an example of a structural equation, as are the two equations 
that constitute the WLM. The equation that we have used to represent the iGL is 
not. That’s because structural equations have a single dependent variable on the 
left- hand side (in the case of the Le, for example, this is the population growth 
rate18) and independent variables on the right- hand side (in the case of the Le 
these are the intrinsic growth rate, the population size, and the carrying capac-
ity). in the case of the iGL, there is no unique dependent variable. That’s because 
we can either manipulate a gas’s temperature to influence just its pressure (if the 
gas is placed inside a rigid container) or its volume (if the gas is placed inside a 
perfectly non- rigid container) or both (if the gas is in an imperfectly rigid con-
tainer). Given this fact, we could take one of two approaches to bringing the re-
lationships it describes within the scope of the structural equations framework. 
One approach would be to define a single variable in terms of P and V— the 
obvious choice would be a variable whose possible values represented values of 
17. See, for example, Glymour and Wimberly (2007), Halpern (2016), Halpern and Hitchcock 
(2015), Halpern and Pearl (2005), Hitchcock (2001; 2007), Pearl (2009: Chapter 10), and Woodward 
(2003).
18. Population size depends on population growth rate (and previous population size). But 
this doesn’t mean that there’s no unique dependent variable in Le, or in each of the equations 
constituting WLM. After all, firstly, it is growth rate (not population size) that ecologists interpret 
as the dependent variable in these models. And, secondly, while the future derivative of population 
size relative to a time t may depend upon population size at t, the population size at t does not de-
pend on its future derivative relative to t (cf. easwaran 2014). The correct interpretation of Le and 
the equations constituting WLM is as representing the dependence of the future derivative (with 
respect to time) of the size of n1 (and n2) upon the values taken by n1 and n2 (and other variables) 
at a given time.
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P × V. Values of this variable could then be treated as the effect of varying a gas’s 
temperature. An alternative would be to note that, at least on some occasions, 
a given system will be naturally representable as one in which pressure is the 
dependent variable and temperature and volume are independent variables (as 
where we have a gas in a rigid container), on others, a system will be naturally 
representable as one in which volume is the dependent variable and temperature 
and pressure are independent variables (as where we have a gas in a perfectly 
non- rigid container), and on still others, a system will be naturally represent-
able as one where a variable defined in terms of both P and V is the dependent 
variable (as where we have a gas in an imperfectly rigid container). Given this 
fact, we can give a structural equation for each specific gas system, with the de-
pendent variable— appearing on the LHS of that equation— determined by the 
nature of the system itself.
A structural equation, or a set of structural equations like WLM entails a set 
of counterfactuals (Hitchcock & Woodward 2003b: 183). For instance, Le tells us 
how the population growth rate would differ under counterfactual suppositions 
about the population size, intrinsic growth rate, and carrying capacity. This is 
determined simply by plugging into the equation the relevant values of n1, rc, 
and K. WLM tells us how the growth rate would vary under counterfactual sup-
positions about these factors plus suppositions about predator population size, 
n2. Structural equations accounts analyze causation in terms of the counterfac-
tuals entailed by SeMs (a SeM simply comprises a structural equation or set of 
structural equations). Consequently, they are a variety of counterfactual analy-
sis. According to typical such analyses,19 relative to the SeM comprising just 
Le,20 the actual value taken by— for example— n1 on some particular occasion 
counts as a cause of the population growth rate, 1dndt , on that occasion because 
there’s some alternative possible value of n1 such that Le implies that, had n1 
taken that alternative value, while rc and K had remained at their actual values, 
the growth rate 1dn
dt
 would have been different. Likewise, relative to the SeM 
comprising the two equations of WLM, typical structural equation analyses will 
count the actual value taken by— for example— n1 on some particular occasion 
as a cause of the population growth rate, 1dn
dt
 , on that occasion, because there’s 
some alternative possible value of n1 such that WLM implies that, had n1 taken 
that alternative value, while rc, K, and n2 (and α), had remained at their actual 
values, the growth rate 1dn
dt
 would have been different. Finally, relative to a SeM 
19. For instance, the accounts of Hitchcock (2001: 286– 287, 289– 290), Woodward (2003: 77, 83– 
84), Glymour and Wimberly (2007: esp. 58), and Halpern and Pearl (2005: 853– 855).
20. Structural equations analyses, in the first place, define causation relative to a SeM. Causa-
tion simpliciter is then typically defined in terms of the existence of causation relative to at least 
one ‘appropriate’ SeM. For discussion of what constitutes an ‘appropriate’ SeM, see Halpern and 
Hitchcock (2010). More will be said about this in Section 6.
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of, say, a system comprising a gas in a rigid container (with pressure as the sole 
dependent variable, and gas quantity, temperature, and volume as independent 
variables), standard structural equation analyses will count (say) the tempera-
ture of the gas as a cause of the gas pressure because there’s an alternative value 
of the temperature such that, had the gas volume and amount remained the 
same, the gas pressure would have been different.
The key point for present purposes is that, as Hitchcock and Woodward 
argue, the sorts of structural equations capable of supporting causal relations 
needn’t correspond to exceptionless laws, but merely to what they call ‘invariant 
generalizations’.21 Generalizations like iGL, Le, and WLM fall short of the stan-
dards of exceptionless laws because they admit of bf exceptions. nevertheless, 
the procedure described above for evaluating counterfactuals— simply plugging 
in the desired counterfactual values for the variables in the model upon which a 
certain variable depends and calculating the result for the dependent variable— 
can be thought of as a procedure for arriving at the ‘closest possible world(s)’ 
in which the independent variables take those alternative values (see Hitchcock 
2001: 283). These are worlds in which significant interfering factors (such as 
strong electric fields in the case of iGL and natural disasters in the case of Le and 
WLM) are absent and so the dependent variable takes the value implied by the 
model. Generalizations like those encoded by iGL, Le, and WLM are thus able 
to support the sort of counterfactual dependencies to which structural equations 
analyses of causation appeal, even though they admit of bf exceptions.
To this point we’ve largely ignored the fact that iGL concerns ‘ideal’ gas-
es, but that no gases are strictly ideal (though many approximate ideal gases, at 
least for moderate values of the variables represented in iGL22).23 Likewise, it’s 
21. Hitchcock and Woodward prefer this term to ‘ceteris paribus laws’. This does appear just 
to be a terminological decision (see reutlinger et al. 2017; Hitchcock & Woodward 2003a: 3; Schurz 
2014: 1805) but, in any case, nothing of substance turns on the distinction here.
22. The fact that some high- level generalizations (approximately) hold only for a certain range 
of values of the variables represented in the generalization is discussed further in Footnote 30.
23. This sort of idealization seems to me distinct from those that ‘idealize away’ background 
influences (cf. earman & roberts 1999: 457, 461– 462). indeed, it seems to me potentially misleading 
to lump both sorts of idealization together under the heading of ‘cp condition’. The bf exceptions 
we’ve been discussing to this point are due to (potential) causal influences on the modelled behavior 
by background variables that are not represented in the generalization and that do not pertain to 
the structure of the modelled system itself. However, the present sort of ‘idealization’ is (a) one 
that pertains to the structure of the system being modelled— in this case the gas itself, and not 
merely its potential causal influences; and (b) is an ideal that few if any actual entities ever exactly 
conform to (in the case of iGL, no actual gases conform exactly to its idealization)— whereas the 
sorts of background factors that we have been discussing so far, and which may lead to bf excep-
tions may quite commonly be absent (or negligible) in actual fact. Moreover, as i note in the main 
text below, a generalization’s making idealizations in the present sense seems to have different 
implications for its ability to underwrite causal relations than does a generalization’s ‘idealizing 
away’ from the sorts of background factors discussed so far. Still, authors such as Cartwright 
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very plausible that Le and WLM contain at least some elements of idealization 
that mean that they hold only approximately even of those real systems that they 
model fairly well. For example, stochasticity in the processes of reproduction 
and death for members of a population are liable to mean that growth rates in 
real populations never perfectly conform to the smooth curve predicted by Le. 
One might wonder whether these sorts of idealization stand in the way of their 
ability to support relations of nomic sufficiency and counterfactual dependence.
Let me illustrate with respect to the iGL what i take to be the most plausible 
line of response to this worry.24 The response i have in mind says that, while 
for some merely approximately ideal gas of amount n*, having a volume v and 
temperature t is not sufficient (in the circumstances) for its having pressure of 
exactly *n Rtv , it is sufficient (in the circumstances) for its having pressure approxi-
mately equal to *n Rtv .25 depending on exactly how one wishes to frame a regular-
ity theory of causation, one could then either say that the effect of the volume 
and temperature of the gas is simply having pressure approximately equal to *n Rtv , 
or one could take the effect to be whatever token of the type having pressure ap-
proximately equal to *n Rtv  the system in fact happens to possess.
if one prefers a counterfactual theory of causation (or a structural equations 
(1980: e.g., 160) (cf. Pietroski & rey 1995: 84– 85, 89– 90) appear to take generalizations that ‘ideal-
ize’ in the present sense as central examples of cp generalizations and i needn’t insist that they not 
be classified under this umbrella.
24. An alternative to the response i’m about to describe might say that generalizations that 
make such idealizations are approximations to, or special cases of, laws that cover non- ideal cases, 
and that it’s these latter generalizations that support relations of nomic sufficiency and counter-
factual dependence between real high- level states. This response might work quite well in some 
cases. For instance, van der Waal’s equation seeks to model the influence of particle size and at-
traction in real gases. The iGL is a special (and never- perfectly- instantiated) case of van der Waal’s 
equation where particle size and attraction is zero. The reservation i have about this approach is 
that it may not always be possible to formulate these more general laws (cf. Cartwright 1980: 161), 
and, even if it is, it may not be possible to do so without reverting to basic physics (cf. Pietroski & 
rey 1995: 98). But once we do that, the danger is that the high- level states which we were taking to 
be potential causes and effects simply drop out of the picture.
25. Cartwright (1980: 160– 161) suggests that we make assumptions like this when explaining 
the behavior of actual systems on the basis of idealization laws. She points out that this rests on the 
further assumption that physical processes are continuous (so that, for example, an approximately 
ideal gas will behave in approximately the way described by iGL). However, we can and do have 
empirical evidence for such continuities. Of course, in cases where physical processes are dis-
continuous, idealization laws won’t underwrite causal relations about non- ideal entities/systems. 
indeed, reutlinger (2014: 1768 Footnote) suggests that there may be some idealization laws that 
describe behavior that isn’t approximated by any real system. if we believe that some entities/sys-
tems that don’t behave in ways that even approximate the behavior described by idealization laws 
are nevertheless involved in causal interactions, then we will need to look for appropriate general-
izations which directly cover the non- ideal cases. in any case, many systems exhibit behavior that 
does approximate that described by high- level idealization laws. For example, many gases behave 
in ways that approximate the behavior described by iGL, while many populations behave in ways 
that approximate the behavior described by Le or WLM.
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variant on such an account), then things are even more straightforward. Sup-
pose that, for a particular system comprising an approximately ideal gas in a 
container, the actual values of P, n, T, and V are p, n*, t, and v. And suppose that 
p ≈ *n Rtv . Then clearly, because for such a gas it’s generally true that P≈ 
*n Rt
v  (or 
at least this is true for a reasonable range of values of n, T, and V), there are pos-
sible values of n, T, and V such that, had the gas system instantiated those values, 
then it would have been that P ≠ p. That’s enough for standard counterfactual 
theories of causation to count n, T, and V taking values n*, t, and v (respectively) 
as causes of P = p.
So far we’ve seen that the fact that high- level generalizations— including 
generalizations of high- level physics such as iGL and special science generaliza-
tions such as Le and WLM— admit of bf exceptions isn’t a reason for thinking 
that there don’t exist the sort of relations of nomic sufficiency or counterfactual 
dependence between high- level states needed to underwrite relations of high- 
level causation. Yet, so far, we’ve not considered all classes of exception of which 
high- level generalizations admit. There’s a certain class, to the description of 
which i turn in the next section, which poses more of a problem.
5. Exceptions Due to Multiple Realizability (MR Exceptions)
A class of exception that poses particular problems for the ability of high- level 
generalizations to underwrite causal relations arises due to the multiple realiz-
ability of the states that such generalizations concern. These are what i’m call-
ing mr exceptions. To illustrate this sort of exception, consider again a system 
comprising a gas in a container. note that the macrostate of such a gas— which 
is the type of state the iGL concerns— is specified by stating the values of macro- 
variables like temperature, pressure, volume, and gas amount. A high- level state 
space for the system can be defined in terms of these variables, with a macrostate 
of the system corresponding to a point in that space. As indicated in Section 2, 
the microstate of the system is given by specifying its location in its microphysi-
cal phase space. Macrostates of the system are multiply realizable by microstates. 
That is, a point in a high- level state space (defined in terms of macro- variables) 
corresponds to a region in its phase space. As List and Pivato put it, macrostates 
are coarse- grainings of or, in other words, correspond to equivalence classes of mi-
crostates.
it is well known that exceptions to thermodynamic generalizations like iGL 
can possibly arise due to certain unusual microphysical realizations of their 
macrostates. For instance, there are possible initial microstates of a system com-
prising a gas in a rigid container such that the pressure on the container walls 
spontaneously decreases without any corresponding change in the gas temper-
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ature, volume, or amount, and even without the presence of any ‘interfering’ 
background factors like strong electric currents (cf. roberts 2014: 1782 Footnote). 
Were such a spontaneous decrease to occur, it would be in violation of the iGL.
This type of exception is one of which many high- level generalizations ad-
mit. Take, for instance, a system comprising a population and its environment. 
As we’ve seen, a three- dimensional state space for this system can be defined 
in terms of the variables that appear in the Le (which we’ll focus on for sim-
plicity): n1, rc, and K. The Le has implications concerning how the system may 
evolve through this state space. But points in this state space are multiply realiz-
able by points in the system’s phase space. And there are points in the system’s 
phase space— very unusual points— that, when evolved forward in accordance 
with the microphysical laws, lead to dramatic entropy decrease. it turns out that 
these points are highly ‘scattered’ in the phase space, so there are almost cer-
tainly such microstates that are compatible with any given macrostate (Albert 
2000: 67). Yet, in the presence of dramatic entropy decrease, the Le won’t even 
approximately hold. After all, members of a population depend upon entropy 
increasing processes— such as the diffusion of oxygen in their lungs— for their 
very survival. Given dramatic entropy decrease, the population will therefore 
collapse rather than evolving in accordance with the Le.
Perhaps more interestingly, the system comprising the population and its 
environment can be represented by state spaces that are intermediate in grain 
between the three- dimensional state space defined in terms of the variables ap-
pearing in Le and the phase space of the system. For example, ecologists have 
noted that the geographical distribution of a population can make a difference to its 
actual growth rate by making a difference to levels of competition for resources 
in subregions of a habitat (Law, Murrell, & dieckmann 2003: 252) and to breed-
ing possibilities (Otto & day 2007: 591). To model the influence of geographical 
distribution upon population growth, a standard approach is to represent the 
population’s habitat as comprising a finite number of spatial subregions (see 
e.g., Otto & day 2007: 591– 594; Hastings 1993; Law et al. 2003). The growth of 
the population in each sub- region is then modeled as a function of the size of the 
population in that sub- region, the size of the population in neighboring regions 
(since this affects net migration levels into the region in question), and other fac-
tors such as the intrinsic growth rate of the population and the carrying capacity 
of the sub- region in question. A very simple such model— which we’ll consider 
for illustrative purposes— might simply divide the habitat into two spatial sub-
regions, with n1i representing the size of the population in sub- region i, and Ki 
representing the carrying capacity of subregion i. A straightforward extension of 
the Le would then provide two equations— giving the growth rates of the sub- 
populations in each of the two regions— with the following form (which i label 
‘SLM’ for ‘Spatial Logistic Model’):
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(SLM) 
1 1
1 2 11 1
1 1 11
1
c
dn nr n an n
dt K
β
 −
= + −  
 
The first term on the rHS of each equation is familiar from the Le. The sec-
ond and third terms represent the influence of migration between the two sub- 
regions. The parameter α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) represents the rate at which members of the 
sub- population in region 2 migrate to region 1, while β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) represents the 
rate at which members of region 1 migrate to region 2. (in this simple model, 
these rates are taken as fixed, though a more sophisticated model might take 
these rates to be functions of, e.g., the size of the sub- population relative to the 
carrying capacity in each of the sub- regions of the habitat.) if these parameters 
were both equal to zero (i.e., if there were no migration between the two sub-
regions of the habitat), then the model would predict simple logistic growth of 
each of the sub- populations in each of the regions of the habitat.
This model allows us to capture in a simple way how population distribu-
tion influences population growth by affecting the level of competition for re-
sources in subregions of the habitat. Of course, one could make the model more 
sophisticated by, for instance, partitioning the habitat into a greater number of 
spatial sub- regions, or by seeking to model the effects of geographical distri-
bution on reproduction rates. But for present illustrative purposes, this simple 
model will do.
 The total size of the population in the habitat, n1, is the sum of the popula-
tion sizes in each of the two sub- regions: 1 21 1 1n n n= + . Similarly, the maximum 
sustainable population size for the habitat, K, is equal to the sum of the maxi-
mum populations that can be sustained in each of its two subregions: K = K1+K2. 
different overall population sizes are multiply realizable by specific geographical 
distributions of the population. in this case, a single value of n1 is compatible 
with different combinations of values of 1
1n  and 
2
1n , while a combination of 
values for 11n  and 
2
1n  determines a value for n1. Likewise, different overall maxi-
mum sustainable population sizes are multiply realizable by different combina-
tions of values for K1 and K2.
 As we saw, Le suggests a representation of the system comprising the popu-
lation and its habitat by a state space of three dimensions— with the dimensions 
corresponding to the variables rc, n1, and K. The SLM, on the other hand, suggests 
a representation by a state space comprising five dimensions: one corresponding 
to each of the variables rc, 11n , 
2
1n , K1, and K2. Since values of the variables n1 and 
K are multiply realizable by combinations of values for 11n  and 
2
1n , and of K1 
and K2 respectively (while the dimension corresponding to rc exists in both state 
2 2
2 1 21 1
1 1 12
1
c
dn nr n n an
dt K
β
 −
= + −  
 
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space representations), points in the three- dimensional state space correspond to 
regions in the five- dimensional state space. Or, as List and Pivato would put it, 
points in the former state space correspond to equivalence classes of points in the 
latter. The latter state space is a finer grained representation of the system than the 
former because it represents not just total population size (and carrying capac-
ity), but how that population (and carrying capacity) is distributed.26
interestingly, it turns out that population growth can be extremely sensitive 
to precise initial conditions, including the precise geographical distribution of 
the population and environmental resources (see Hastings 1993; May 1974). For 
instance, even a very small perturbation of the precise, individual- by- individual 
initial geographical distribution of members of a population can make a differ-
ence to whether the overall population grows in (approximate) accordance with 
Le or sharply declines, even when the population size is well below the overall 
carrying capacity (see Hastings 1993). When it comes to those populations that 
are normally well- modelled by the Le, it is presumably the case that the precise 
geographical distributions that lead to such sharp population declines are rare. 
The situation in which the population is initially precisely distributed in one of 
those rare ways that leads to dramatically Le- violating behavior is analogous to 
a thermodynamic system’s being at one of those rare points in its phase space 
that leads to a decrease in entropy.
For present purposes, it’s a moot question whether we class mr exceptions 
as cases where the cp conditions associated with a generalization are violat-
26. The state space constructed from the variables in Le is thus a higher- level state space than 
that constructed from the variables in SLM. Could it also be said that a state space constructed 
from the variables in Le is a higher- level state space than that constructed from the variables in 
WLM or that a state space constructed from the variables in Boyle’s Law is a higher- level state 
space than that constructed from the variables in iGL? i take the answer to be ‘no’ for the reason 
that the variables in WLM and iGL are simply supersets of those in Le and Boyle’s Law respective-
ly, reflecting the fact that they simply incorporate the influence of (metaphysically) independent 
factors that were left as background in Le and Boyle’s Law rather than genuinely representing 
the system in some more fine- grained way. The variables in SLM, by contrast, are not a superset 
of those in Le. rather, the variables n1 and K in Le are replaced in SLM by the pairs of variables 
1
1n  and 
2
1n  and K1 and K2, respectively. Still, one might observe, we could define new variables: X 
≡ 3 × PV and Y ≡ 2 × PV, so that X – Y = nRT. The variables appearing in the latter generalization 
aren’t simply a superset of those in Boyle’s Law. But presumably our reasons for not wanting to 
count iGL as representing systems at a ‘lower level’ than Boyle’s Law apply also to this general-
ization. The upshot is that i think we must, either by modifying our definition of multiple realiz-
ability, or List and Pivato’s characterization of what it is for one state space to be ‘higher- level’ 
than another, add the restriction that one state space does not count as ‘lower- level’ than another 
(perhaps because its states don’t genuinely count as ‘multiply realizing’ those of that other) if it 
is parameterized by a set of variables that is, or is defined by logico- mathematical operations upon, a 
superset of the variables in terms of which that other is parameterized. (note that one can’t make 
logico- mathematical inferences from the values of n1 and K to the specific values of 11n  and 
2
1n  and 
K1 and K2, so the variables in SLM continue to count as parameterizing a more fine- grained state 
space than do those in Le.)
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ed.27 What’s important is that, as we shall see in Section 6, mr exceptions pose 
quite a different set of challenges from bf exceptions to a generalization’s abil-
ity to support causal relations— a challenge that existing accounts of how non- 
exceptionless generalizations can support causal relations appear unable to meet.
MR exceptions are quite different in nature from bf exceptions. BF exceptions— 
as i have characterized them— are due to the (causal) influence of factors that are 
representable by (macro- )variables that are metaphysically independent of those 
that appear in the original generalization. By contrast, mr exceptions are due to 
unusual realizations of the states represented by the variables in the original gen-
eralization. These lower- level states are not metaphysically independent of those 
represented by the variables in the original generalization. if we seek to eliminate 
exceptions of this type from our generalizations, we do not simply add variables, 
but rather replace the variables in our model with variables that represent more 
fine- grained states of affairs. Thus, in seeking to formulate a generalization that 
avoids the exceptions to Le that arise because of the possibility of certain ways 
the population may be distributed, we replace the variable that simply represent-
ed the overall size of the population (n1) with variables that represent the size of 
the population in different geographical sub- regions of the habitat. The overall 
size of the population in a habitat is not metaphysically independent from the 
size of the population in each of the sub- regions of the habitat: facts about the 
latter determine facts about the former in a stronger- than- nomological manner.
Similarly, in seeking to formulate a generalization that avoids the exceptions 
to iGL— or for that matter Le, WLM, or SLM— due to rare but possible micro-
physical realizations of the macrostates of the systems these generalizations seek 
to model, we would need to opt for a model that, instead of representing the sys-
tem’s macrostate (using variables like temperature, pressure, and volume in the 
case of iGL) contains variables representing its microstate, that is, the positions 
and momenta of the particles it comprises. The macrostate of a system (such as 
a gas in a container) is not metaphysically independent from its microstate: the 
latter determines the former in a stronger- than- nomological manner.
Before discussing the problems mr exceptions pose for high- level causation 
and potential resolutions of that problem, it’s worth noting that there are excep-
tions to high- level generalizations that are a sort of ‘mixed case’ between mr excep-
tions and bf exceptions, and in fact these may be more common than pure mr ex-
ceptions. This is brought out by Fodor’s (1991) discussion— prompted by Schiffer 
27. Schiffer (1991: 7) appears to view such exceptions in this way, saying “certain realizations 
[of the high- level state described by the generalization] may themselves be among the defeating 
conditions alluded to in the ceteris paribus clause.” in Fenton- Glynn (2016), i argued that such 
exceptions should not be construed as cases in which the cp clause of the generalization is violated. 
However, i don’t wish to take a stand on this issue here. For relevant discussion, see earman and 
roberts (1999: 463– 465).
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(1991)— of the distinction between what he calls ‘mere exceptions’ and ‘absolute 
exceptions’ to high- level generalizations. Absolute exceptions correspond closely 
to pure cases of what i’ve been calling mr exceptions; ‘mere exceptions’ are more of 
a mixed case. To make the distinction clear, a little background is needed.
Suppose that a particular high- level generalization admits of bf exceptions, 
but not mr exceptions. Then, following Schiffer (1991) and Fodor (1991), call the 
‘background’ circumstances that must obtain for the values of the independent 
variables in that generalization to genuinely nomically suffice for the value of its 
dependent variable a ‘completer’. ignoring, for the moment, its mr exceptions, a 
‘completer’ for iGL— or an application of it where, say, pressure is the obvious 
dependent variable because the gas is heated in a rigid container— might involve 
the absence of strong electric currents through the gas, and so on.
One of Schiffer’s (1991: 4) key insights is that it may often be the case that 
there is no high- level state that serves as a ‘completer’ for a high- level general-
ization that admits of what i’m calling bf exceptions, or at least not one at the 
level of the generalization in question. indeed, this may well be true for the iGL. 
For instance, suppose that a gas is in a container that is impervious to any but 
very high velocity molecules. Given scattering, we know that microstates of a 
thermodynamic system that lead to normal thermodynamic behavior typically 
differ from those that don’t only by a small perturbation. Consequently, enough 
incident high- velocity particles entering the container in just the right way could 
alter the gas’s microstate in such a way as to put it in a state that leads to ther-
modynamically abnormal behavior, with the consequence that the gas’s behav-
ior does not (approximately) conform to iGL. The manner of incidence of high- 
velocity incident particles seems to be a microphysical fact that a high- level state 
description of the gas- in- container system, even together with a high- level state 
description of its environment, does not capture. Thus, a ‘completer’ for iGL 
would appear to involve microphysical facts.
Schiffer’s (1991: 5) second key insight is that microphysical factors (or more 
generally lower- level factors) may not act as ‘completers’ for the states captured 
by the high- level variables featuring in the original generalization. For example, 
the precise pattern of incidence of high- velocity particles does not combine with 
the facts about the gas’s macrostate to yield a condition that’s sufficient for behav-
ior according to the iGL. That’s because whether the precise pattern of incidence 
of high- velocity particles does or does not prevent the gas from behaving in ac-
cordance with the iGL depends on the microstate of the gas itself— that is, upon 
how the macrostate of the gas is realized. So really, the facts about the precise 
pattern of incidence of high- velocity particles is only a completer (or at least part 
of a completer) for the microstate of the gas, that is, a condition with which the 
microstate of the gas combines to form a sufficient condition for later microstates 
that realize a macrostate in which (say) the pressure of the gas is higher.
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Fodor (1991: 24)— drawing upon Schiffer’s insights— observes that, even if 
there exists a nomologically possible (micro- level) completer for every possible 
realizer of the gas’s macrostate, it may well be nomologically possible for a par-
ticular realizer to occur without one of its completers. in terms of our running 
example this would be so if the microstate of the gas were changed, because of 
the actual pattern of incidence of high velocity particles, into one that leads to 
unusual thermodynamic behavior despite the fact that alternative patterns of 
incidence of such particles wouldn’t have transformed it into such a state. Cases 
where all realizers of the state described by the independent variables in a gen-
eralization have nomologically possible completers, but where, on a particular 
occasion, a realizer occurs without its completer, are termed ‘mere exceptions’ 
by Fodor (1991: 24). Cases of ‘mere exceptions’ are really a kind of mixed case 
between what i have termed bf exceptions and mr exceptions. in such cases the 
micro- realizer of the macrostate captured by the independent variables in the 
generalization conspire with (micro- level) background factors to produce an ex-
ception to the generalization. evidently we’ll need to be sensitive to mixed case 
exceptions like this, as well as to bf and mr exceptions, if we are to account for 
high- level causation.
Pure cases of mr exceptions arise where a realizer of the state described by 
the independent variables in a generalization is instantiated and that realizer has 
no nomologically possible completer. Fodor (1991: 24) calls exceptions that arise 
where such realizers are instantiated ‘absolute exceptions’. As Schiffer puts it, 
while some exceptions to high- level generalizations may result (at least in part) 
from the interference of background factors, “certain realizations of [a system’s 
macrostate] M may themselves be among the defeating conditions” (1991: 7).
The iGL might admit of absolute exceptions if, for example, there are possible 
realizers of the macrostate of a gas- in- container system such that no possible en-
vironmental interference could perturb its microstate in such a way as to lead to 
it evolving in (approximate) conformity with the iGL. This might be the case if, 
for example, the gas is in a microstate which is such that, if it is unperturbed by 
environmental interference, it will lead to thermodynamically unusual behavior 
and the gas is in a lead container that shields it from environmental interference 
thus ensuring that no such influence is possible.28
28. Of course, the fact that the gas is in a lead container might itself be considered a ‘back-
ground factor’. So perhaps a more clear- cut example of an absolute exception would be the excep-
tion to the Second Law of Thermodynamics (SLT) that arises if the total entropy of the universe 
as a whole declines for a time. There is no possibility of outside influence upon the universe as a 
whole. Yet its total entropy may still decline for a while if its initial microstate is of the right sort.
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6. MR Exceptions and Causation
MR exceptions to high- level generalizations— including those of the pure, abso-
lute, variety and those of the mixed, mere exception variety— pose a problem for 
the accommodation of high- level causal relations in a way that pure bf exceptions 
(i.e. cases where a high- level generalization admits of exceptions because of the 
possibility of interference from high- level background factors) do not. Fodor, 
Lepore and Loewer, and Hitchcock and Woodward’s arguments (reviewed in 
Section 4) that non- exceptionless generalizations can support relations of nomic 
sufficiency and counterfactual dependence apply well to generalizations that ad-
mit only of (pure) bf exceptions. But we have now seen that high- level laws at 
least often admit of mr exceptions too.
Suppose, for instance, that the volume of a gas is reduced while the temper-
ature and gas amount is held constant, and suppose that this occurs in circum-
stances in which the gas isn’t subject to a strong electric field, or any other sort 
of interfering high- level background factor. And suppose that the pressure of 
the gas increases. We might naturally think that the reduced volume is a cause 
of the increased pressure. Yet it now appears that, in fact, the reduced volume 
is not a non- redundant element of a set of conditions present on the occasion 
in question that is sufficient for the increased pressure. This means that it’s not, 
as the arguments due to Fodor that we considered in Section 4 might have led 
us to believe, a cause of the increased pressure by the lights of sophisticated 
nomic regularity theories of causation. The reason is that, as we have seen, it’s 
possible for the volume of the gas to be reduced, even while the temperature 
and gas amount is held fixed, the gas is not subject to a strong electric field, and 
so on, while the gas pressure still does not rise. That’s because there are (highly 
unusual) micro- realizers of the macrostate of the gas system as the gas volume 
is reduced (perhaps together with the microstate of its environment— which 
may include, for example, incoming high- velocity particles) that lead, accord-
ing to the microphysical laws, to precisely this result. now, given that the gas 
pressure in fact increased, its microstate (together with the microstate of its en-
vironment) wasn’t in fact one of these highly unusual ones. nevertheless, it’s 
only the precise microstate itself (perhaps together with the microstate of the 
environment), and not the macrostate of the gas system that it realizes that (in 
the circumstances) is sufficient for an increase in gas pressure (cf. Schiffer 1991: 
7). Moreover, if the facts about the macrostate of the gas were added to the set 
of facts about its microstate (and that of its environment), the facts about the 
macrostate would be redundant, because the facts about the microstate of the 
gas (and its environment) are already a sufficient condition for the increase in 
gas pressure (cf. Hoefer 2004: 106).
drawing a similar distinction to that made here between bf and mr excep-
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tions, Hoefer (2004) suggests that high- level states that are putatively sufficient 
in the circumstances for a given effect face
the enemy from without, and the enemy from within. The kinds of prob-
lems we have dealt with so far [viz., interfering background factors] . . . 
count as enemies from without. But . . . in many cases we need to exclude 
the enemy from within: microscopic initial- and boundary- conditions 
that are just perverted and ‘atypical’ enough to entail the non- production 
of the usual effect. . . . if the macro- level [state] proposed [as a cause] 
supervenes on the ‘wrong’ initial conditions . . . then all sorts of weird 
things may take place, including the failure of the customary effect e to 
ensue. (Hoefer 2004: 105)
Fodor (1991) himself doesn’t develop his account of how generalizations can 
support causal relations in light of the possible existence of absolute and mere 
exceptions, but only develops an account of how to reconcile the idea that a gen-
eralization admits of absolute and mere exceptions with its being both true and 
non- vacuous. indeed, as should be clear from the preceding discussion, it’s hard 
to see how an account of how generalizations that admit of absolute and mere 
exceptions can nevertheless support relations of nomic sufficiency would go.
it also appears that the sort of exception under consideration makes trouble 
for the ability of high- level generalizations to underwrite the sort of counter-
factuals in terms of which causation is analyzed by counterfactual analyses (cf. 
Hoefer 2004: 107– 109; Hájek 2017). For instance, we might wish to say that a gas’s 
current volume is a cause of its pressure. But it’s possible for the gas pressure 
to be lower or higher than predicted by the iGL (even when there’s no strong 
electric field or anything like that) due to the system’s (or the system together 
with its environment’s) being in an unusual initial microstate. That is, there are 
possible micro- realizers of the gas system (plus its environmnent) in which a 
lower or a higher than usual number of the particles (or of the relatively high 
velocity particles) impact upon the container walls. even if the actual microstate 
of the gas (plus its environment) is a relatively normal one (thus the pressure is 
roughly what is predicted by the iGL), it appears false that, if the gas volume 
had been different, the gas pressure would have been different. After all, if the 
gas volume had been different, the gas just might have been in one of those rare 
microstates that (together with the microstate of its environment) results in the 
pressure being exactly the same as it actually is.29 The reason to think this is that 
29. For arguments that the rarity of the microstates leading to the ‘deviant’ macroscopic be-
havior doesn’t mean that they’re irrelevant to the truth- values of the counterfactuals in question, 
see Hájek (2017) and Hoefer (2004: 109). For instance, it doesn’t seem that it can be maintained that 
worlds in which ‘deviant’ microstates are instantiated are less close/similar to the actual world 
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the gas couldn’t be in a different macrostate (as it would be if the volume were 
different) without being in a different microstate. Moreover, it’s difficult to see 
that there could be a fact about which specific microstate it would be in (given 
that many microstates are compatible with the counterfactual supposition about 
its macrostate). Given the ‘scattered’ nature, in the phase space of the system, 
of the microstates that lead to unusual macroscopic behavior there are, for any 
given macrostate, such microstates that realize it. Moreover, given scattering, 
it’s plausible that only by specifying the full microstate of the system (plus its 
environment) would we specify a state upon which the gas pressure genuinely 
counterfactually depends. But counterfactual dependence on a microstate is not 
what is needed, by the lights of counterfactual analyses of causation, to give us 
genuine high- level causation.
The present problem also afflicts structural equations versions of the coun-
terfactual approach to causation. Suppose we have a ‘structural’ equation for the 
gas system that expresses its pressure as a function of its temperature, volume, 
and amount: P = *n Rtv . We thus treat pressure as the dependent variable for this 
system, at least on this occasion. The trouble is that, interpreted as a structural 
equation, this equation entails counterfactuals of the form, ‘if the amount of gas 
had been n′, the gas temperature had been t′, and the container volume had been 
v′, then the gas pressure would have been n Rtv
′ ′
′ ’. But generally such counterfac-
tuals are false for reasons we have already seen: namely that if the amount of 
gas had been n′, the gas temperature had been t′, and the container volume had 
been v′, then the microstate of the gas might have been one of those unusual ones 
that does not give rise to a gas pressure of (approximately) n Rtv
′ ′
′ . encoding false 
(or at least not approximately true) counterfactuals is one way in which a SeM 
can count as ‘inappropriate’ (Hitchcock 2001: 287; Halpern & Hitchcock 2010) so 
that, even though such a model seems to imply that the gas volume is a cause 
of its pressure (because it implies that the former counterfactually depends on 
the latter), this doesn’t imply that gas volume is a genuine cause of its pressure 
(because the counterfactuals encoded by the model are false).30 To obtain a struc-
than those in which ‘normal’ microstates are instantiated, at least not on the standard, Lewisian 
(Lewis 1979) account of similarity among possible worlds (see Hoefer 2004: 109– 110; Hájek 2017; 
Fenton- Glynn 2016: 279– 281), especially as ‘deviant’ microstates are sometimes instantiated in the 
actual world (see Hoefer 2004: 110).
30. in fact, Hitchcock and Woodward (2003a; 2003b) in effect weaken this condition on model 
‘appropriateness’ slightly by requiring that the structural equations in a model are accurate (or in 
their terminology ‘invariant’) over a certain range of possible values for the variables on the rHS 
of the equations (i.e., that the counterfactual values that they entail for the variable on the LHS 
were the variables on the rHS to take values in this range are the true counterfactual values that 
the variable on the LHS would take in such circumstances) but not that they be accurate over the 
whole range. (Such generalizations that are accurate over only a certain range correspond to what 
reutlinger et al. [2017: Section 3.1] term ‘restricted’ cp laws. This corresponds to an additional type 
of exception of which a scientific generalization may admit, though not one that poses a threat to 
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tural equation that represents what gas pressure genuinely counterfactually de-
pends upon, it seems that its variables (those on the rHS at least) would need 
to represent the microstate of the gas (plus its environment). But then structural 
equations analyses would only yield the result that it is the microstate of the gas 
(plus its environment), and not its macrostate, that is the cause of the gas pres-
sure. They would therefore not imply that we have a case of high- level causation.
Analogous points can be made with respect to the Le and WLM. it would 
be very natural for an ecologist to take the small size of a population relative 
to its environment’s carrying capacity to causally explain the high growth rate 
of the population (see Tsoularis & Wallace 2002). Yet, as indicated by Hastings 
(1993), it appears that there are some precise individual- by- individual ways a 
population of a given size might be geographically distributed that (even in the 
absence of predation, natural or manmade disasters, etc.), rather than leading 
to usual logistic growth, lead to quite different growth behavior (Hastings 1993: 
1365). interestingly, it appears that, in a state space that represents the precise 
geographical distribution of members of a population, those points that lead to 
abnormal growth patterns are highly dispersed or ‘scattered’ (Hastings 1993: 
1370), just as the points that lead to unusual thermodynamic behavior are highly 
‘scattered’ in the phase space of a system. This means that, for any given overall 
population size, it’s likely that it is compatible with precise population distribu-
tions that lead to abnormal growth patterns. So a population’s having a certain 
low size n1 relative to the carrying capacity K is not sufficient for a high growth 
rate (more precisely, a growth rate close to rc) even in circumstances where inter-
fering background factors, like natural disasters and so on, are absent.
in order to find a state that might be sufficient (in the circumstances) for Le 
or WLM- like population growth, it would seem necessary to model the geo-
graphical distribution of the population (along the lines of SLM) and not simply 
their ability to underwrite causal relations, and least not by the lights of Hitchcock and Wood-
ward’s account.) The trouble is that, given the point about the ‘scattered’ nature in phase space 
of points leading to unusual macroscopic behavior for the gas, it appears that any combination of 
values taken by the variables on the rHS will be compatible with the system’s being at one of these 
deviant points in its phase space, so that the structural equation under consideration won’t even 
be accurate (‘invariant’) over a certain range.
Another point worth noting about the structural equations approach— at least on the versions 
espoused by Woodward (2003) and Hitchcock and Woodward (2003a; 2003b)— is that it is associ-
ated with a specific way for evaluating counterfactuals. namely, we’re supposed to consider what 
would happen if their antecedents were realized by ‘interventions’. The notion of an ‘intervention’ 
is a (semi- )technical term defined by Woodward (2003: 98). roughly speaking, we can think of an 
‘intervention’ as an ideal experimental manipulation of the variables mentioned in the antecedent 
of the counterfactual to set them to the required values. But appealing to this special way of evalu-
ating counterfactuals doesn’t get us off the hook. After all, no part of Woodward’s (2003: 98) defini-
tion of an intervention entails, for any values of n, V, and T, that, if the gas had been intervened on 
to set the values of n, V, and T equal to those values, the gas wouldn’t have been in one of those rare 
microstates such that its pressure was significantly different from *n Rtv  (cf. Fenton- Glynn 2016).
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its overall size. Yet even if the geographical distribution is not one of those rare 
ones that is such as would normally lead to growth quite out of keeping with 
Le or WLM (in circumstances where natural disasters, and so on are absent), it 
is doubtful whether even it is sufficient (in these circumstances) for Le or WLM- 
like growth. After all, it’s possible that the microstate of a system comprising a 
population geographically distributed in that way, together with its environ-
ment, might be one of those rare ones that leads to radical entropy decrease and 
to population collapse. So, in order to get a condition that’s truly sufficient (in 
the circumstances) for Le or WLM- like growth, we may again need to look to 
microphysics. if this is so then, by the lights of sophisticated regularity theories 
of causation, we do not have a case of genuine high- level causation.
Analogous points hold with respect to counterfactual theories of causation. 
Consider, for instance, the claim that the large size of the population relative to 
the carrying capacity was a cause of its low growth rate. The trouble is that, if 
the population size had been lower, then it just might have been distributed in 
one of those rare ways that leads to unusual growth patterns and so the popula-
tion might still have grown at a low rate. To see this note that a smaller popu-
lation can’t be geographically distributed in precisely the same individual- by- 
individual way. Thus, if the population size had been different, its geographical 
distribution would have been different too. And, given scattering, there seems 
little ground for saying that the alternative geographical distribution wouldn’t 
have been one of those that leads to an unusual growth pattern.
if we wished to find a state upon which the population growth rate does 
genuinely counterfactually depend, we might look to the more fine- grained state 
consisting in the population’s precise geographical distribution. For it might be 
that there are certain alternative precise geographical distributions to the actual 
one (perhaps realizing lower population sizes) that definitely would have result-
ed in a higher population growth rate. However, even this claim is problematic. 
That’s because one can’t change the geographical distribution of a population 
without changing the microstate of the system of which it is part and so, given 
scattering, it appears that, had the precise geographical distribution of the popu-
lation been different, it just might have been the case that the system comprising 
the population and its environment was realized in one of those rare microphys-
ical ways that leads to dramatic entropy decrease and hence population collapse.
Structural equations variants of counterfactual analyses have similar diffi-
culties accommodating the judgment that population size is a cause of popula-
tion growth rate. As we have seen, interpreted as structural equations, Le and 
the equations that comprise WLM, entail counterfactuals. Yet, even though they 
imply that the population growth rate counterfactually depends on the size of 
the population relative to the carrying capacity (and, in the case of WLM, on the 
size of any predator population), it now appears that (at least many of) the coun-
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terfactuals that they encode are false. This means that, even though these SeMs 
entail counterfactual dependence of population growth rate upon population 
size relative to carrying capacity, they are not apt ones for assessing whether the 
latter is genuinely a cause of the former by the lights of standard structural equa-
tions analyses of causation. it appears that, if we wished to model states upon 
which the population growth rate genuinely does counterfactually depend, we’d 
need to move to a finer- grained model representing precise geographical distri-
butions or indeed beyond that, to one representing the microstate of the system 
comprising the population and its environment. But such models no longer rep-
resent population size as a cause of growth rate (but rather represent more fine- 
grained states as causes).
it thus appears that mr exceptions, unlike bf exceptions, pose a genuine dif-
ficulty for the ability of high- level laws to underwrite causal relations. in the 
next two sections, i’ll argue that, in fact, there are high- level generalizations that 
do not admit of mr exceptions and are thus able to underwrite genuine high- 
level causal relations. These generalizations are probabilistic approximations to mr 
high- level generalizations and the causal relations that they underwrite are also 
probabilistic.
7. Probabilistic High- Level Generalizations
in Section 6, i argued that the apparent fact that high- level generalizations often 
admit of mr exceptions— both of the pure, absolute type, and the mixed, mere 
exception, type— poses a problem for the accommodation of high- level causal re-
lations in a way that the fact that they typically admit of bf exceptions does not. 
i will now argue that the most promising line of response to this problem is 
to maintain that high- level generalizations that admit of mr exceptions are ap-
proximations to probabilistic generalizations that don’t admit of mr exceptions, 
and that these probabilistic generalizations can support relations of probabilistic 
high- level causation.
The case is perhaps clearest when we consider the iGL. Let’s start out by 
ignoring the possibility of microphysical influences from outside the gas- in- 
container system. it was observed in Section 6 that some possible micro- realizers 
of a gas- in- container system lead to later microstates of the system that don’t 
realize macrostates in which PV=nRT is approximately satisfied and, likewise, 
changes to the values of P, V, n, or T will sometimes issue in microstates that 
don’t lead to the gas approximately conforming to PV=nRT. However, we can 
give a precise sense to the claim that such microstates are ‘rare’: namely, the 
volume they occupy in the phase space of the system (and— given scattering— 
in the region of phase space associated with any initial macrostate of the sys-
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tem) is very small indeed on the standard, Lebesgue, measure. indeed, standard 
statistical mechanics (SM) furnishes us with a way to assign probabilities to a 
system being in such a microstate. it does this by invoking the Boltzmann dis-
tribution— a distribution that’s uniform with respect to the Lebesgue measure. 
Consequently, standard SM entails not only that such microstates are ‘rare’, but 
that they are corresponding improbable. in effect, then, SM entails a probabilis-
tic version of iGL, which entails that it’s highly probable that an (approximately) 
ideal gas will (approximately) obey PV=nRT because it’s highly probable that its 
initial microstate is one that leads, via the fundamental dynamical laws, to its 
doing so (cf. roberts 2014: 1782 Footnote). Given scattering, this is so no matter 
what the initial macrostate of the system is. Cases in which the initial macrostate 
of a system are realized in one of those rare ways that leads to the system not 
approximately conforming to PV=nRT are not exceptions to this probabilistic 
version of iGL. Such cases are covered by the probabilistic generalization, but 
are simply assigned a low probability by it.
Such a probabilistic version of iGL is able to underwrite causal relations. For 
instance, consider the claim that the decrease in the volume of a container hold-
ing a gas held at a constant temperature was a cause of the increase in pressure. 
While a probabilistic iGL doesn’t imply that the decrease in container volume 
(even in circumstances where the temperature and gas amount is held constant, 
and the gas isn’t subject to a strong electric field, or anything like that) was suf-
ficient for the gas pressure to rise (since there are possible realizers of the initial 
macrostate of the gas post- volume- decrease that lead to quirky macro- behavior 
in which the pressure on the container walls doesn’t increase, at least for a time), 
it does imply that the decrease in container volume was sufficient (in the circum-
stances) for a very high (SM) probability of the gas pressure rising.
Likewise, consider situations in which the container size had not been de-
creased. A probabilistic iGL again implies a very high probability that the gas 
(approximately) obeys PV=nRT. For the most likely such situations (in which, for 
example, no one has significantly increased the temperature of the gas), there is 
thus a high probability that the pressure of the gas is relatively low. The prob-
ability of the gas pressure being relatively high is thus higher conditional upon 
the gas volume being decreased than it is conditional upon the gas volume not 
being decreased.
Similarly, while a probabilistic iGL doesn’t support the (false) counterfactual 
‘if the gas volume hadn’t been decreased, then the gas pressure would have been 
lower’ (since the macrostate of the gas and container system just might have been 
realized in one of those rare microphysical ways that leads to unusually high 
pressure, at least for a time), it does support the (true) counterfactual ‘if the gas 
volume hadn’t been decreased, then the (SM) probability of its pressure being 
lower would have been high’. it supports this counterfactual because, in each of 
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the closest worlds in which the gas volume isn’t decreased (which don’t include 
worlds in which, for example, someone rapidly increases the temperature of the 
gas or passes a strong electric current through it31), the macrostate of the gas and 
container system has a much lower SM probability of being realized in a way 
that leads to higher pressure than does the actual macrostate of the system in 
which the volume of the container has been decreased.
The fact that the container volume’s being decreased raises the probability 
of the gas pressure increasing (in both the conditional probability and coun-
terfactual senses described in the previous two paragraphs) is just the sort of 
fact to which probabilistic analyses of causation appeal.32 The sequence, it might 
thus be claimed, is a paradigm case of probabilistic causation. no wonder nomic 
regularity and counterfactual theories (including their structural equations vari-
ants) were unable to accommodate it: these are theories of deterministic causa-
tion being (mis)applied to a case of probabilistic causation!
So far we’ve been setting aside consideration of microphysical environmen-
tal influences. But handling them doesn’t pose too much of a problem. note that, 
where a gas- in- container system is free of the sorts of macroscopic interferences 
that have previously been described (e.g., a strong electric current being passed 
through the gas), there are very few initial microstates of the gas- in- container- 
plus- its- environment system that lead by the fundamental dynamics to a later 
state in which the gas does not (approximately) obey iGL. Moreover, given scat-
tering, we know that any microstate of the gas- in- container- plus- its- environment 
system that leads to iGL violation for the gas differs from one that doesn’t by 
only a small perturbation. Therefore, given whatever microstate the environ-
ment of the gas- in- container happens to be in, the SM probability that the mac-
rostate of the gas- in- container system is realized in one of those ways that does 
not combine with the actual microstate of the environment in order to yield iGL 
violation is extremely high. The probability of conformity to the iGL conditional 
upon any possible macrostate of the gas- in- container is therefore high. Also, as-
31. The fact that a probabilistic version of iGL still admits of bf exceptions thus doesn’t pre-
vent it from supporting the sorts of counterfactuals about probabilities— or, indeed, as was seen 
in the previous paragraph, conditional probabilities— appealed to in popular analyses of probabi-
listic causation. responding to a suggestion of earman and roberts (1999) (cf. roberts 2014), Hüt-
temann and reutlinger (2013) and reutlinger (2014) (cf. Kowalenko 2014: 142 Footnote) provide 
arguments that suggest that bf exceptions can’t in general themselves be fully modelled probabi-
listically. if they’re right, we should not expect a probabilistic iGL that admits of bf exceptions to 
be replaceable by a probabilistic iGL that does not.
32. Probability- raising understood in the conditional probability sense figures in the probabi-
listic analyses of causation developed by reichenbach (1971), Good (1961a; 1961b), Suppes (1970), 
Kvart (2004), and Glynn (2011). understood in the counterfactual sense, it figures in the analyses 
given by Lewis (1986), Menzies (1989), and ramachandran (2004). Twardy and Korb (2011), Halp-
ern (2016: 46– 53), and Fenton- Glynn (2017b) develop accounts of probabilistic causation that are 
analogues of deterministic structural equations approaches.
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suming as before that the sets of nearest possible worlds in which the macrostate 
of the gas- in- container differs from its actual macrostate in regard of (say) the 
temperature of the gas don’t contain worlds in which a strong electric current is 
passed through it (or anything like that) this means that, when we counterfactu-
ally suppose the temperature of the gas- in- container system to be varied, there 
remains a high SM probability that it will conform to the iGL.
it’s plausible that probabilistic approximations to special science generaliza-
tions that admit of mr exceptions can be derived in a similar way to a probabilis-
tic version of the iGL: namely by imposing probability distributions over more 
fine- grained state spaces, though these state spaces needn’t be phase spaces. 
We’ve seen that the geographical distribution of members of a population can 
be modelled using spatial logistic models. These replace the variable in Le and 
WLM that represents overall population size in the habitat with variables that 
represent the sizes of sub- populations in spatial sub- regions of the habitat. They 
thus represent more fine- grained states that can only be fully captured by a more 
fine- grained state space than one parameterized by the variables in Le or WLM. 
Yet, as we’ve seen, in transitioning to these more fine- grained models we lose 
the ability to treat the coarse- grained population size as a cause of population 
growth.
Fine- grained spatial logistic models require more information as input to 
yield predictions as output than do more coarse- grained models: specifically, 
they require fine- grained information about the geographical distribution of 
members of the species, as opposed to just the relatively coarse- grained informa-
tion about its overall size. instead of inputting all this fine- grained information, 
ecologists often model the initial geographical distribution of a population by 
means of a probability distribution over its possible initial geographical distribu-
tions (Vandermeer & Goldberg 2013: 126– 142). A natural way to do this is to im-
pose a uniform probability distribution over the state space 𝕊SLM parameterized 
by the variables in a spatial logistic model (which include variables representing 
the size of sub- populations in spatial sub- regions of the habitat, rather than a 
variable simply representing overall population size) and then to condition that 
distribution on the fact that the system occupies the subregion R of 𝕊SLM cor-
responding to the initial overall size of the population (see Law et al. 2003: 254, 
257; cf. Coe, Ahnert, & Fink 2008). For the sorts of population that are normally 
well- modeled by (say) Le the measure of points in any such subregion R that 
leads, by the dynamics, to Le- like growth is presumably (given scattering) high. 
The uniform distribution will therefore entail a high probability— though not 
equal to one— for Le- like growth. This yields a probabilistic version of Le (cf. 
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Law et al. 2003).33 non- Le- like behavior does not constitute an ‘exception’ to this 
probabilistic generalization, for such behavior is assigned an explicit (low) prob-
ability by the generalization. The suggestion is that such a generalization, like a 
probabilistic version of SLT, can support the sorts of probability- raising relations 
appealed to in probabilistic analyses of causation.
As has already been noted, the dynamics through 𝕊SLM are modeled by a spa-
tial logistic model. Yet, as we have noted, a spatial logistic model is itself likely 
to admit of mr exceptions. if for no other reason, this is because points in 𝕊SLM 
correspond to regions in the system’s phase space and, given scattering, it seems 
that any such region will contain a set of points (very small in measure) that lead 
to widespread entropy decrease and— given the dependence of members of the 
population upon entropy increasing processes for their survival— a collapse in 
population numbers rather than normal growth. Yet (given scattering) the prob-
ability distribution over the system’s phase space that’s uniform on the standard 
measure entails a (very low) probability that the microstate is an element of this 
set, conditional upon whichever point in 𝕊SLM the system happens to be in. But 
then imposing such a distribution gives us a probabilistic approximation to the 
original deterministic spatial logistic model, one that doesn’t admit of mr ex-
ceptions. This generalization entails probabilistic dependencies of population 
growth rates on the way the population is geographically distributed, and such 
dependencies are precisely the sort to which standard analyses of probabilistic 
causation appeal. Such a probabilistic approximation to a spatial logistic model 
thus seems able to support relations of probabilistic causation between (for in-
stance) the geographical distribution of a population and its growth rate.
recall that a probabilistic version of the Le— which models a system’s dy-
namics through a state space parameterized by the variables n1, rc, and K— can 
be arrived at by imposing a probability distribution over the more fine- grained 
state space, 𝕊SLM, parameterized by the variables featuring in a spatial logistic 
model of the system. Assuming the distribution is uniform, and the dynamics 
through 𝕊SLM are deterministic, the probability of Le- like growth given that the 
system is at a point in the more coarse- grained state space corresponding to 
a region R of 𝕊SLM is proportional to the measure of the set of points within R 
that, when evolved forward according to the deterministic dynamics that govern 
the system’s evolution through 𝕊SLM (i.e., a deterministic spatial logistic model), 
yield Le- like growth. For a system that is normally well- modelled by the Le 
33. earman and roberts (1999: 464– 465) briefly suggest that being able to impose a measure 
over the realizers of the states described by a high- level science might be the key to giving determi-
nate truth- conditions to high- level scientific generalizations, though they regard this as necessary 
for making sense of the notion that a generalization holds in ‘most of its intended applications’ 
rather than for deriving an explicitly probabilistic approximation to the original non- exceptionless 
generalization.
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this measure is presumably high. But we’ve now noted that the true dynamics 
through 𝕊SLM are unlikely to be deterministic— but rather are given by a proba-
bilistic approximation to a spatial logistic model. nevertheless, the derivation 
of a probabilistic approximation to Le goes through almost as before: the prob-
ability of Le- like growth given that a system is at a particular point in the state 
space parameterized by the variables that figure in the Le is now a weighted 
average (or ‘probability mixture’) of the probabilities with which points in the 
corresponding region R of 𝕊SLM issue in Le like growth, with the weights (the 
‘mixture weights’) given by the (uniform) distribution over R. Where a system 
is normally well- modeled by the Le this probability mixture presumably yields 
a high probability for Le- like growth. Again, such a probabilistic Le is able to 
support the sort of probabilistic dependence relations in terms of which proba-
bilistic causation is standardly analyzed.
in more technical jargon, the target system (here a population and its envi-
ronment) can be represented by a hierarchical model. This comprises a nested 
series of ‘levels’ or state spaces 〈𝕊1, 𝕊2, . . . , 𝕊n, S〉, where S is the phase space of 
the system, and where 𝕊1, 𝕊2, . . . , 𝕊n are coarse- grained state spaces, with points 
in 𝕊1 corresponding to regions in 𝕊2, points in 𝕊2 correspond to regions in . . . 𝕊n, 
and points in 𝕊n corresponding to regions in S. The probability that the future- 
truncation of the system’s history at the level of 𝕊i will be 𝕙
i
t+  given that the 
point in 𝕊i that it occupies at t is 𝕙i(t) is given as a mixture of the probabilities 
with which the points in the region of 𝕊j (j – i = 1) corresponding to 𝕙i(t) lead 
to future- truncated histories 𝕙
j
t+ that realize the future- truncated history 𝕙
i
t+ , 
where the mixture weights are given by a distribution over 𝕊j. (if the dynamics 
of the system through 𝕊i are non- Markovian, then we might wish to ask what 
the probability is that the future- truncation of the system’s history at the level of 
𝕊i will be 𝕙
i
t+  given that its (past- )truncated history is 𝕙
i
t . That would involve 
taking a mixture of the probabilities with which (past- )truncated histories 𝕙
j
t  
that realize the (past- )truncated history 𝕙 it  lead to future- truncated histories 
𝕙
j
t+  that realize the future- truncated history 𝕙
i
t+ , where the mixture weights are 
again given by a distribution over 𝕊j.) The same points apply mutatis mutandis to 
the derivation of probabilities of future- truncated histories through 𝕊n from the 
(Boltzmann) distribution over S.
We’ve been imagining our population plus environment system to be mod-
elled by a hierarchical model comprising three levels: the fundamental level rep-
resented by the system’s phase space, the level parameterized by the variables 
in a spatial logistic model, and the level parameterized by the variables in the 
Le. But it might be fruitful to conceive of it as modelable by a hierarchical model 
comprising even more levels (for instance, perhaps there are fecund representa-
tions of the system at levels that are higher than the phase space, but lower than 
the space parameterized by the spatial logistic model). in this case, derivation 
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of probabilities for the system’s evolution through its highest- level state spaces 
may proceed via probability mixing with respect to these levels too.
in general, which more fine- grained levels should be invoked in deriving 
probabilities for the evolution of a system through a state space of a given level 
will depend upon how well ‘fitting’ the resulting probabilities are, in a sense to 
be discussed in the next section. As Callender and Cohen (2010: 437– 438, 443– 
444) argue, it’s rather plausible that the best- fitting probabilities for sciences like 
ecology aren’t derived by directly imposing a probability distribution on the 
region of a system’s phase space compatible with its instantiation of various 
values of ecological variables (like population size). Going ‘via’ state spaces of 
intermediate levels in deriving ecological probabilities can plausibly improve fit.
Hoefer (2004: 110– 113) briefly considers a response to the problem posed 
for high- level causation by what i have been calling mr exceptions that, like that 
developed here, takes high- level causation to be probabilistic. He objects to such 
a response on the grounds that the probabilities that must be invoked are not ro-
bust enough to underwrite ‘genuine causation’. The nub of his central objection 
appears to be expressed in the following passage:34
it may be supposed that one can appeal to a ‘natural’ distribution [over 
initial conditions] on something like thermodynamic [and statistical me-
chanical] grounds, to shore up the idea that a certain probability x emerg-
es naturally. . . . For simple problem set- ups like shielded coin- flippers 
or gases in boxes and so forth – i.e., for problems that have a uniform 
micro- description that we can handle with physical theory – this claim 
will sometimes be plausible. But unlike ‘rigid rectangular box of volume 
V with a newtonian gas of identical particles in a [Maxwell- Boltzmann] 
distribution at temperature T’, ‘Smokes 2 packs a day, . . .’ has no canoni-
cal distribution of micro- descriptions; and the boundary conditions (i.e. 
external influences, at the micro- level) are even less plausibly regiment-
able. There is just no reason to suppose that one set of micro- states of 
males- smoking- 2- packs- daily+environment counts as ‘normal’, ‘probable’ or 
what have you, while another one does not. (Hoefer 2004: 112 Footnote)
34. Another worry that he voices— which is that there is something philosophically problem-
atic about assigning (objective) probabilities to initial conditions, as is done in SM (and ecology)— 
is one that i don’t share (nor indeed does it appear to be shared by more recent temporal parts of 
Hoefer himself— see Frigg and Hoefer 2010; 2015). in a similar vein, Schiffer (1991: 8) is skeptical 
that generalizations admitting of what Fodor calls ‘absolute exceptions’ (and ‘mere exceptions’) 
can be treated as (approximations to) probabilistic laws because he thinks that no probability that 
isn’t derived from fundamental physics could be an objective chance. in the next section i will 
describe a plausible metaphysical picture which vindicates probability assignments to initial con-
ditions and the interpretation of probabilities for high- level states derived from such assignments 
as objective chances.
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Hoefer is right that isolated thermodynamic systems admit of a natural (or at 
least standard) micro- characterization that takes the form of the phase space state 
description of those systems, and that there’s a natural measure (the Lebesgue 
measure) and probability distribution (the one that’s uniform on the Lebesgue 
measure) that yields probabilities for such a system’s being in such- and- such  a 
type of microstate given that it’s in so- and- so a macrostate. But it’s obviously 
not just gases in boxes that have phase spaces. Any thermodynamically isolat-
ed system— including the universe as a whole— has a well- defined phase space 
associated with it to which the standard measure and probability distribution 
can be applied. This means that, for any non- isolated system (such as a person 
smoking cigarettes, or an ecosystem), a probability distribution over its external 
micro- influences is in principle derivable given the initial macrostate of some 
isolated system of which it is a part (in the worst case, the universe as a whole). 
Although we can’t derive such a probability distribution in practice, we never-
theless have evidence about its nature. For instance, the fact that gases in boxes 
typically conform (approximately) to the iGL is evidence that the probability 
of such things as high- velocity particles from outside interfering in such a way 
as to put the system on an entropy- decreasing trajectory is very low. The fact 
that certain (macroscopically) identifiable sorts of population in certain (macro-
scopically) identifiable sorts of circumstance typically conform to Le is evidence 
that the probability of micro- influence from outside the system comprising the 
population and its environment that is such as to lead to significant Le violation 
is low. And, to use Hoefer’s example, the fact that smokers contract lung can-
cer much more frequently than non- smokers is evidence that the probability of 
micro- influence from outside (say) a system comprising the world- line of a smoker 
together with those of the cigarettes that spatio- temporally intersect with her world- line 
during the period of their intersection that is such as to prevent damage to the cells 
lining her lungs is low.
So i don’t think there is a failure of ‘regimentability’ of ‘external influences, 
at the micro- level’ on such systems that poses problems for their being subject 
to probabilistic high- level causal relations. But Hoefer seems to have another 
worry too: namely, that such systems lack a ‘uniform micro- description’. now 
clearly, if we are prepared to include ‘enough’ environment (so that the system 
plus its environment) constitutes a thermodynamically isolated system, then it 
will have a canonical micro- description, namely the system’s phase space state, 
which is well- defined when the system- plus- environment is thermodynami-
cally isolated. Yet scientists seek to derive probabilities for the behaviors of non- 
isolated systems from distributions over lower- level state spaces where those 
state spaces are coarser- grained than phase- spaces. For example, as we’ve seen, 
recognizing that the geographical distribution of a population can make a differ-
ence to its growth rate, ecologists sometimes seek to derive probabilities for the 
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future growth rate of a population by imposing a probability distribution over 
the possible initial geographical distributions of members of the population given 
the initial population size (Vandermeer & Goldberg 2013: 126– 142). Of course 
this is only successful because ecologists are able to recognize when the sorts of 
macroscopic background factors (e.g., culling programs) liable to interfere with 
normal growth are absent, or because these are sufficiently infrequent, and be-
cause the sorts of microscopic external influences (which presumably ecologists 
are unlikely to recognize unless they realize salient macro- states) liable to inter-
fere significantly are sufficiently low probability. Yet part of Hoefer’s worry here 
might be that the lower- level state descriptions appealed to by special scientists, 
and the probability distributions over them that are invoked, have nothing like 
the canonical status that phase space descriptions and the Boltzmann distribu-
tion invoked in SM do.
i think the correct response, which shall be developed in the next section, 
is that the true chances for processes such as those under discussion are those 
probabilities entailed by the theorems of the ‘best’ axiom system either for the 
world (see Lewis 1994) or for the special sciences concerned with the processes 
in question (see Callender & Cohen 2009; 2011). What those chances are will de-
pend upon the state spaces and the probability distributions over them that are 
invoked in such systematizations which, depending on our degree of skepticism 
about the current state of science, we may presume to correspond less or more 
closely to some of those currently invoked by scientists.
Before saying more about this, it is worth noting that Hoefer may not be en-
tirely satisfied with this response. At a couple of points Hoefer (2007: 107, 111) 
suggests that Humean accounts of laws and chances— of which the Best System 
approaches i have alluded to are normally taken as a variety— don’t give us laws 
and chances that are robust enough to underwrite ‘genuine’ causal relations. To 
the extent that Hoefer is just expressing the common worry about Humeanism— 
that because Humean ‘laws’ and ‘chances’ supervene upon, but don’t ‘govern’ 
the mosaic they lack the modal robustness to play the law and chance role in 
explaining and being stable under counterfactual assumptions— i have noth-
ing to add to the (to my mind, plausible) responses to this general worry giv-
en by Lewis (1994: 478– 479), Loewer (2012: 130– 132), and others. But perhaps 
there’s more to Hoefer’s worry. At some stages, he seems to worry that such 
accounts won’t yield ‘determinate’ high- level probabilities (Hoefer 2004: 111). 
This seems connected with his worry that there do not appear to be canonical 
micro- descriptions and probability distributions for modelling certain systems.
On the Best System approach, determinate chances for high- level pro-
cesses will be entailed provided that (a) there is a determinate best system for 
our world; (b) that determinate best system entails probabilities for high- level 
processes; and (c) the probabilities that the determinate best system entails are 
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themselves determinate. in Section 8, i will argue that all serious candidates 
for Best Systemhood entail probabilities for high- level processes. However, i’m 
sympathetic to the denial of both (a) and (c). i’m sympathetic to the denial of (c) 
because fairly compelling arguments have been advanced to suggest that cer-
tain high- level processes are best interpreted as being subject to imprecise— that 
is, (non- singleton) set valued— chances, rather than precise chances (see, for ex-
ample, Fine 1988 and Fierens, rêgo, & Fine 2009 and references therein).35 But, if 
this is correct, then it is not just Humeans who ought to make room for imprecise 
chances in their ontology. i’m also sympathetic to the denial of (a)— that is, i’m 
sympathetic to the view that there is not a unique best system for our world. As 
i’ve argued elsewhere (see dardashti, Glynn, Thébault, & Frisch 2014; Fenton- 
Glynn 2017a; Fenton- Glynn 2017c), i don’t think this is a problem for Humeans, 
but rather i think that this gives Humeans an additional reason to believe that the 
chances for our world are imprecise.
Still, the chances pertaining to high- level processes need not be precise for 
them to underwrite high- level causal relations. Standard probabilistic analyses 
of causation appeal to the central idea that (perhaps when the values of certain 
other variables are held fixed at appropriate values) causes raise the probability 
of their effects either in the sense that the probability of the effect conditional 
upon the cause (and the values of certain other variables) is greater than the 
probability of the effect conditional upon the absence of the cause (and the val-
ues of certain other variables) or in the sense that the probability of the effect 
would have been lower than it actually was if the cause had been absent (and 
if certain other variables had taken certain appropriate values). note that the 
probabilistic facts appealed to by standard probabilistic analyses of causation 
are thus qualitative, comparative facts about certain probabilities being lower or 
higher than others, not precise numerical facts about their values. even if prob-
abilities are imprecise, these qualitative facts can still determinately hold. For in-
stance, as arguments given in (dardashti et al. 2014), (Fenton- Glynn 2017a), and 
(Fenton- Glynn 2017c) indicate, insofar as it’s plausible that (high- level) chances 
are set valued, it’s extremely plausible that the minimum chance for a gas’s pres-
sure increasing non- negligibly if its volume is decreased non- negligibly (and its 
amount and temperature stay constant, and no- one passes a current through the 
gas, etc.) exceeds the maximum probability of its pressure rising non- negligibly 
if its volume is not decreased non- negligibly (and its amount and temperature 
stay constant, and no- one passes a current through the gas, etc.).
i have sketched what i take to be a scientifically and metaphysically plau-
sible account of how there can be high- level causation, even though the gen-
35. This may not be true only of high- level events/processes (see Suppes & Zanotti 1991; Hart-
mann & Suppes 2010).
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eralizations described in the high- level sciences typically admit of mr (and bf) 
exceptions. now it’s possible that Hoefer may still insist that the relations that i 
have argued to exist, and to constitute causal relations between high- level states 
(roughly probability- raising relations, where the probabilities in question derive 
from probability distributions over lower- level state spaces, may be imprecise, 
and are deemed chances by Best System- like accounts) don’t constitute what 
he refers to often as ‘genuine causation’ and once as “what most philosophers 
would call a robust, genuine form of causation” (Hoefer 2004: 111). But i don’t 
see why we should wish to maintain this. Hoefer believes that what he calls ‘gen-
uine causation’ is something that seems to be incompatible with determinism “in 
a complex world such as the one we inhabit” (Hoefer 2004: 99– 100). Moreover, 
it’s difficult to see that his arguments turn in any essential way upon ours being 
a deterministic world (Hoefer 2004: 110 Footnote). So i suggest that, if Hoefer is 
going to require that ‘genuine causation’ requires something more than the re-
lations that i have described, his conception of what would constitute ‘genuine 
causation’ is too demanding. Certainly it seems to me much more revisionary 
of our ordinary and scientific (and indeed philosophical) ways of thinking and 
talking about the world to deny that there is genuine (high- level) causation than 
to accept the account of what that relation consists in that i have here described, 
which seems to me both scientifically and metaphysically plausible.
One final piece of unfinished business remains, which is to argue in more de-
tail that the probabilities entailed by the high- level probabilistic generalizations 
that i’ve described in this section do indeed constitute genuine chances, which 
are therefore apt to underwrite genuine relations of high- level causation. This is 
the topic of the next section. As already indicated, i will draw upon Best System- 
style analyses of chance to argue the point.
8. High- Level Chances?
in the previous section i argued that there are high- level probabilistic generaliza-
tions that do not admit of mr exceptions and that are able to support the kind of 
probabilistic dependencies to which popular accounts of probabilistic causation 
appeal. Yet one might wonder whether the probabilities in question are genuine 
objective chances, given that they don’t derive from the microphysical laws, but 
rather their derivation involves imposing probability distributions (which are 
not themselves derived from the fundamental dynamic laws) over underlying 
state spaces. it seems quite plausible that such probabilities must be objective 
chances if they are to underwrite genuine high- level causal relations.
in recent years, a significant number of philosophers of science have argued 
that there are genuine objective chances that don’t derive from the fundamental 
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dynamic laws alone.36 A particularly popular argument for this view— though 
by no means the only argument37— appeals to the claim that the popular Best 
System Analysis (BSA) of laws and chance— which received its most detailed 
development by Lewis (1994)— as well as variants upon it counts SM probabili-
ties, and plausibly also probabilities associated with probabilistic special science 
generalizations, as genuine objective chances.38
According to the BSA, the laws are the axioms and theorems of that axiom 
system pertaining to what goes on in the universe that strikes the best balance 
between the theoretical virtues. The chances are the probabilities entailed by 
those axioms and theorems. The specific theoretical virtues appealed to by Lewis 
are simplicity, strength, and fit.39 According to Lewis (1994: 480), a system is 
strong to the extent that it says “either what will happen or what the chances will 
be when situations of a certain kind arise”. The reason to think that adding axi-
oms to a system that already entails the fundamental dynamic laws so that it en-
tails probabilistic macrophysical generalizations, like a probabilistic version of 
iGL, and probabilistic special science generalizations, like probabilistic versions 
of Le and WLM, is that this increases the strength or informativeness of the sys-
tem in question. The reason is that such high- level generalizations tell us what 
the chances will be when situations arise that are of kinds concerning which the 
fundamental dynamic laws are silent. The kinds of situation in question are, of 
course, situations of high- level kinds.
Take, for example, situations of the high- level kind being an approximately 
ideal gas of amount n’ and temperature t’ in a container of volume v’. The fundamen-
tal dynamic laws don’t tell us what the pressure of the gas will be, or what the 
probability distribution over various possible pressures will be when situations 
of this kind arise. They tell us only about what the pressure will be in situations 
of microphysical kinds like being at such- and- such a point in phase space. But, be-
cause of its multiple realizability, the fact that a system is of the high- level kind 
an approximately ideal gas of amount n’ and temperature t’ in a container of volume 
v’ does not entail what point in its phase space the system is at. By contrast, a 
probabilistic iGL does provide us with information about what the probability 
distribution over possible pressures is when situations of this high- level kind 
arise. Consequently, a system that entails a probabilistic iGL is more informative 
than one that entails the fundamental dynamic laws alone.
36. A partial list includes Albert (2012), dunn (2012), emery (2015), Frigg and Hoefer (2010; 
2015), Glynn (2010), ismael (2009; 2011), and Loewer (2001).
37. For different arguments, see emery (2015) and ismael (2009; 2011).
38. Such arguments have been advanced by, inter alia, Loewer (2001; 2007; 2012), Callender 
and Cohen (2009; 2010), dunn (2011), Frisch (2014b), Glynn (2010), and Weslake (2014).
39. A system’s fit is the probability that it assigns to the actual course of history (Lewis 1994: 
480). See elga (2004) for a critique of, and suggested amendment to, Lewis’s notion of fit. The ques-
tion of the correct notion of fit needn’t detain us here.
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Likewise, a system entailing a probabilistic Le tells us what the chances are 
when a situation arises of the kind a population with size n’1 and intrinsic growth 
rate r’c in a habitat with carrying capacity k’. Again, the fundamental dynamic laws 
alone don’t tell us what the chances are when a situation of this kind arises, since 
this kind of situation is multiply realizable by microphysical kinds.
in general, fundamental dynamic laws and probabilistic special science or 
macrophysical generalizations entail probability distributions conditional upon 
different sorts of proposition. High- level generalizations entail probability dis-
tributions conditional upon propositions about high- level states or kinds that 
a system instantiates P(·|𝕙(t)), while the fundamental dynamic laws entail dis-
tributions only conditional upon propositions specifying a system’s microstate 
P(·|h(t)).40 There is no conflict between divergent conditional chance distribu-
tions with different conditions. indeed, an axiom system that entails both con-
ditional distributions is more informative than one that entails only one (and 
leaves the other undefined).
it is a good question at exactly how high a price in simplicity this greater 
strength or informativeness is bought. The questions of exactly how much sim-
plicity the addition of the extra axioms required to entail the probabilities of 
SM costs, and of whether the strength gained is worth the price, are discussed 
(and disputed) by Loewer (2001: 617– 618), Schaffer (2007: 130– 131), Hoefer 
(2007: 560), and Glynn (2010: 59– 63).41 The difficulty is that there aren’t obvious-
ly most reasonable simplicity and informativeness metrics to apply (cf. Lewis 
1994: 479). This, together with the fact that it’s not obvious how to trade off sim-
plicity against informativeness, makes it difficult to answer the latter question. 
Similar issues would obviously arise when we consider whether the best system 
includes axioms sufficient to entail probabilistic special science generalizations, 
such as probabilistic versions of Le, WLM, or SLM.
in fact, i’m inclined to think that a prioristic discussion over what the right 
simplicity and strength metrics to apply are, and what the correct exchange rate 
is between these virtues, gets things backwards. A more naturalistic approach 
would look to science and the generalizations there that are treated as playing 
the law role in supporting counterfactuals, underwriting causal explanations, 
and entailing probabilities that are taken by scientists to play the chance role of 
explaining outcomes and frequencies of outcomes, constraining credences, and 
so forth. The idea would then be to reverse- engineer the standards of simplicity 
and strength, and the exchange rate between them, that scientists are implic-
itly committing to in their theory building. if it turns out that scientists, across 
disciplines, implicitly adopt similar standards, then we might regard the disci-
40. The latter distributions are trivial— that is, the probabilities are all 1s and 0s— if the funda-
mental dynamics are deterministic.
41. See also Callender and Cohen (2009: 10) and dunn (2011: 91).
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plines as jointly contributing— in their own separate ways— to the building (or 
discovery) of a best system for the universe as a whole. if instead it turns out that 
rather different standards are adopted in the various disciplines, then— rather 
than the traditional BSA— we might prefer something along the lines of the so- 
called Better Best System Analysis (BBSA), developed by Callender and Cohen 
(2009; 2010),42 as our metaphysical account of laws and chances.
Briefly, Callender and Cohen’s proposal draws upon Lewis’s (1983: 367– 368) 
observation that a system’s simplicity depends upon the vocabulary in which it 
is expressed. But, rather than following Lewis in restricting the systems under 
consideration to those whose axioms contain only perfectly natural kind predi-
cates (more on this point in a moment), their idea is that best systemhood should 
be taken to be relative to a set of basic kinds K (or predicates PK). relative to 
different sets of kinds, different axiom systems strike the best balance between 
simplicity, strength, and fit. A generalization is a law relative to K just in case it is 
a theorem of the Best System relative to K, and a probability is a chance relative 
to K if it’s entailed by a generalization that is a law relative to K.
On Callender and Cohen’s view, the generalizations of a special science 
(such as ecology) count as laws of that science if they are theorems of the best 
system relative to the science’s proprietary kinds or predicates (e.g., the ecologi-
cal kinds).43 Callender and Cohen (2010: 437– 438) and Callender (2011: 103, 112) 
themselves suggest that the best axiomatizations for various special sciences will 
include probability distributions over underlying state- spaces (which need not 
be phase spaces), where those distributions closely match the frequencies with 
which higher- level properties are realized in the state spaces in question. As 
we’ve seen, including such distributions is key to deriving probabilistic approxi-
mations to generalizations like Le, WLM, and SLM. On Callender and Cohen’s 
view, the probabilistic theorems generated by the resulting axioms are probabi-
listic laws of the sciences in question, and the probabilities that they entail are 
chances of the sciences in question.
Although this isn’t a suggestion that Callender and Cohen explicitly make, if 
we wish to take a naturalistic approach to standards of simplicity, strength, and 
42. For proposals similar to Callendar and Cohen’s, see Schrenk (2008) and dunn (2011: 88– 
90).
43. Weslake (2014), responding to Callender and Cohen’s proposal, suggests that axioms 
needed to derive SM result from a best system for the conjunction of the fundamental kinds and 
the thermodynamic kinds. it seems that Callender and Cohen (2009: 10, 28) and Callender (2011: 
106– 112) are sympathetic. Likewise, it seems that we would need to conjoin the ecological kinds 
with certain underlying kinds in order to generate a system that entails an appropriate probabi-
listic version of, for example, the Le. indeed, Callender and Cohen (2009: 24) make the point that 
the BBSA implies that there are laws relative to any set of kinds relative to which a meaningful best 
system competition can be conducted and won (though we may simply not be interested in the 
laws relative to certain vocabularies— for instance, gruesome vocabularies).
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balance, and we find that such standards vary from discipline to discipline, then 
we might take the view that the laws of a special science are determined by a best 
system competition relative to that special science’s proprietary vocabulary and 
that science’s proprietary standards of simplicity, strength, and balance.
On the other hand, if we regard the enterprise of science as more unified, 
with each discipline making a different contribution to the construction of an 
overall best system for the universe, then we may prefer the original BSA as our 
metaphysical picture of laws. Still, we would need to address Lewis’s point that 
the simplicity of a system is relative to the vocabulary in which it’s expressed. 
if we follow Lewis in requiring that a system is only simple in the pertinent re-
spect if it’s simple when expressed in perfectly natural kind terms, we’re liable 
to rule out the existence of laws or chances that are not derivable from the laws 
and chances of fundamental physics alone. That’s because any axiom pertaining 
to the kinds of a higher- level science (such as an axiom concerning temperature, 
pressure, and volume) is likely to be syntactically very complex when translated 
into a language with only perfectly natural kind terms (cf., Schaffer 2007: 130; 
Callender & Cohen 2009: 14). Consequently, such an axiom is not likely to figure 
in the Best System.
One option would be to follow Callender and Cohen in treating best system-
hood as vocabulary- relative. However, a more conservative modification of the 
BSA to accommodate high level laws and chances is possible. To see this, observe 
that, as Lewis recognizes (1983: 368), naturalness admits of degrees. naturalness 
of the predicates that it employs might reasonably be taken to be a theoretical 
virtue, to be weighed alongside the simplicity and strength of a system. if an 
axiom system is able to achieve significant simplicity and strength by employ-
ing not- too- unnatural predicates like ‘temperature’ or ‘carrying capacity’, then 
it’s a plausible best system. Again, i see this as a more naturalistic approach 
than a prioristic restrictions on the relevant vocabulary (cf. Callender & Cohen 
2009: 17– 20). For one thing, it gives science a stronger role in determining what 
are the predicates that may figure in the laws of nature; for another, it accom-
modates scientists’ actual judgments about which generalizations are lawlike (in 
the sense of supporting counterfactuals, predictions, and causal explanations, 
being confirmed by their instances, and so forth) and entail probabilities that 
play the chance role in guiding credence, explaining outcomes and frequencies 
of outcomes, and so on.
The suggestion, then, is that an appropriate version of the BSA (or, if one 
prefers, the BBSA) will treat high- level generalizations— including probabilistic 
macrophysical generalizations, such as a probabilistic iGL, and probabilistic spe-
cial science generalizations, perhaps including a probabilistic version of WLM 
(or indeed a probabilistic Le or SLM)— as laws, or at least as lawful enough to 
support counterfactuals, to be such that the probabilities they entail are genuine 
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objective chances, and thus to support causal relations. After all, this appears to 
be the way that scientists themselves treat them. For example, Linquist, Gregory, 
elliot, Saylor, Kremer, and Cottenie (2016: 130)— speaking about ecology— state 
that “current practices in the discipline . . . collectively point in the direction of 
causal generalizations at all levels”. indeed, a naturalistic approach to laws of 
nature suggests that, even if one doesn’t think that some variant on the BSA (or 
BBSA) is correct, one’s account of laws should endorse certain probabilistic high- 
level generalizations, such as those that we have considered here, as sufficiently 
lawful to support causal relations (cf. ismael 2009; 2011; emery 2015).
9. Conclusion
it has been argued that the problem posed for high- level causation by the appar-
ent absence of exceptionless high- level generalizations can be overcome. There’s 
one class of exception— bf exceptions— of which high- level generalizations ad-
mit, but that doesn’t prevent them from underwriting high- level causal rela-
tions. There’s another class of exception— mr exceptions— of which they appear 
to admit that does pose a threat to a generalization’s ability to underwrite causal 
relations. However, drawing upon the case studies of SM and ecology, i have ar-
gued that a strong case can be made that deterministic high- level generalizations 
that admit of mr exceptions are approximations to probabilistic generalizations 
that don’t admit of mr exceptions. These probabilistic generalizations are able to 
support the sort of objective chance dependencies (between high- level states) to 
which probabilistic analyses of causation appeal. To the extent that this general-
izes, the apparent problem posed for high- level causation by the seeming lack of 
exceptionless high- level generalizations can be overcome.
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